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The terrorist attacks of September 11, perpetrated by Is- 
lamic extremists from foreign lands, have branded American 
consciousness perhaps even more deeply than any other strike 
against the natibn in the modern era.l The first major attack 
on the mainland United States in nearly 200 years,2 September 
1 The Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor may have been a greater 
blow to our security, but that attack did not occur on the mainland and did not 
involve the loss of as many civilians as did the September 11 attacks. 
2 The last such attack occurred during the War of 1812, when the British, 
among other things, attacked Washington D.C. and burned the Capitol and the 
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11 has been burned into body politic and represents a visible 
threat to our security and to our way of life. Americans natu- 
rally have demanded immediate measures to  apprehend those 
responsible and to insure that similar attacks may not happen 
again. 
Governmental officials responded frenetically to September 
11. Among other things, federal authorities immediately ques- 
tioned and detained hundreds of immigrants from Islamic coun- 
tries,3 and Congress rushed to  pass the Patriot Act4 in such a 
short time that not only did our representatives little debate the 
bill, but few had time to  read the "complex, far reaching anti- 
terrorism [and anti-immigrant] legislation" in its entirety.5 Fol- 
lowing the aftermath of September 11, policies and practices ' 
against the foreign born have continued. Aside from President 
Bush's authorizing military tribunals to try only foreigners, not 
American  citizen^;^ both the state and federal governments, 
often with the help of private  citizen^,^ have engaged in unprec- 
White House. See War of 1812, 27 F r m ~  & WAGNALLS ENCYCLOPEDIA 143 (1986). 
The 1993 World Trade Center bombing pales in comparison. 
3 See Center for Nat'l Security Studies v. Dep't of Justice, 331 F.3d 918 (D.C. 
Cir. 2003). 
4 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Re- 
quired to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 
Stat. 272 (2002). 
5 Robin Toner & Neil L. Lewis, A NATION CHALLENGED: House Passes 
Terrorism Bill Much Like Senate's, But With 5-Year Limit, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 
2001, a t  B6. The Patriot Act contains several provisions that may in application, if 
not on their face, be unfair to immigrants. Section 411, for example, makes an 
immigrant deportable for contributing "material support" to an organization desig- 
nated by the Secretary of State as a terrorist organization. The Act does not re- 
quire that the immigrant know the organization has been so designated or that the 
support provided will contribute to a terrorist operation. See New Antiterrorism 
Legislation Summarized, in 78 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1703, 1704 (Nov. 5, 2001). 
Section 412 permits the Attorney General to detain any alien he certifies that he 
"reasonably believes to be a terrorist or to have engaged in any other activity that 
endangers the national security of the United States." Id. 
6 See Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War 
Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833,57,834 (Nov. 13,2001). The United States 
also initially targeted only visitors from predominately Arab and Muslim coun- 
tries, requiring them to be fingerprinted, photographed, and subjected to interro- 
gation under oath. See infra notes 65-71 and accompanying text. 
7 See infra notes 37-38 and accompanying text (discussing the role that racial 
profiling by American citizens has played in detaining Arab and Muslim looking 
immigrants). Since September 11, Arabs and Muslims living in the United States 
have reported increased incidence of discrimination in housing and employment. 
See Muzaffar A. Chishti, Doris Meissner, et al., America's Challenge: Domestic Se- 
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edented racial profiling of innocent South Asians, Arabs and 
Muslims living in this c o ~ n t r y . ~  
Times of emergency may justify certain restrictions on lib- 
erties, but the nature of the terrorist challenge calls for a much 
more measured and nuanced response. Al Qaeda is said to have 
cells operating in as many as sixty co~nt r ies .~  Furthermore, Al 
Qaeda is best described as a decentralized network of extremist 
Islamic groups and individuals rather than a unified military 
organization.lO To reduce or eliminate the threat they pose re- 
quires the cooperation of the governments, police officers, and 
individual citizens in the countries where A1 Qaeda linked indi- 
viduals and groups operate. Such help is necessary to obtain 
intelligence, arrest, capture, prosecution, and extradition of al- 
leged terrorists, not to mention to cut off their funds and to  con- 
fiscate their arms and other assets. The thesis of this article is 
that to the extent the United States discriminates against or 
otherwise unfairly treats Arabs and Muslims living here or 
wishing to visit here, the more difficult it will be for the United 
States to  get the help we so desperately need not only in the 
curity, Civil Liberties, and National Unity after September 11,  in 80 INTERPRETER 
RELEASES 1193, 1195-96 (Aug. 25, 2003) (noting that the Equal Employment Op- 
portunity Commission ("EEOC") "received over 700 complaints concerning Sep- 
tember 11-related employment discrimination in the first 15 months after the 
attacks"). In addition, hate crimes against Muslims "soared after September 11, 
rising more than 1,500 percent [but] [tlhe number of violent hate crimes has since 
tapered off." Id. a t  1195. See also United States, Hate Crimes Against Arabs and 
Muslims and Persons Perceived to be Arab or Muslim After September 11 ,  14 
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH ANNUAL REPORT NO. 6(g) (Nov. 2002) (noting that Arab and 
Muslim organizations reported over 2,000 hate crimes and the FBI received a sev- 
enteen fold increase in complaints of hate crimes in 2001 after September 11). 
8 See infra notes 94-96 and accompanying text. 
9 See Dan Balz & Bob Woodward, America's Chaotic Road to War; Bush's 
Global Strategy Began to Take Shape in First Frantic Hours After Attack, WASH. 
POST, Jan. 27,2002, a t  Al. The destruction of the Afghan camps had "one perverse 
and unintended effect[:] Terrorists and their supporters who had formerly been 
concentrated in one known place were dispersed to home regions and new hideouts 
like Chechnya, Yemen, East Africa and Georgia's Pankisi Gorge. Regional com- 
manders of A1 Qaeda, says Rohan Gunaratna, author of a leading book on the net- 
work, are now 'operating independently of centralized control' . . . [and] no longer 
depend on anything from bin Laden and his top brass except for ideological inspi- 
ration." Michael Elliot, World: Why the War on Terror Will Never End; Bomb At- 
tacks in Riyadh and Casablanca Suggest That Even on the Run, al-Qaeda is a 
Resilient Threat to the West, 161 TIME MAG. no. 21, May 26,2003, at 26, available 
at 2003 WL 7740534. 
10 See id.; see also infra notes 171-174 and accompanying text. 
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United States, but also in Arab and Muslim countries and com- 
munities throughout the world. 
It has now become clear that the phrase "the war on terror- 
ism" has not only become unthinkingly part of the lexicon but 
also dangerously overbroad. One commentator put it aptly: 
Wars have typically been fought against proper nouns (Germany, 
say) for the good reason that proper nouns can surrender and 
promise not to do it again. Wars against common nouns (poverty, 
crime, drugs) have been less successful. Such opponents never 
give up. The war on terrorism, unfortunately, falls into the sec- 
ond category. l1 
Emergency measures put into effect because of the "war on ter- 
rorism" may likewise never end and, by invoking such a broad 
description of the threat, governmental officials may justify en- 
forcement actions both at  home and abroad that have little to do 
with our immediate security.12 The Executive's calculated use 
of this broad and vague phrase, "the war on terrorism," which 
the media have largely accepted without question, has led us 
down some dangerous paths and is still leading us in scary di- 
rections. Rather than claiming to  fight the amorphous "war on 
terrorism,"l3 we should specifically name the enemy,14 A1 
Qaeda, and those, like the Taliban, who lend support to A1 
11 Granville Byford, The Wrong War, FOREIGN AFF., July.-Aug. 2002, a t  34, 
available at 2002 WL 2085047. Byford states that common nouns, such as "terror- 
ism" (as in the "war on terrorism") are vague and imprecise whereas proper nouns, 
"Germany" or "Iraq," for example, are concrete. When determining whether to use 
armed force, involving the killing of human beings and the destruction of property, 
government officials in a democracy have an obligation to identify with a reasona- 
ble degree of definiteness the country, organization, or individuals who are the 
object of the plan of attack. Cf: City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999) 
(requiring a criminal loitering statute to be reasonably definite). 
12 For a thoughtful discussion of how to characterize this conflict, see gener- 
ally Kenneth Roth, The Law of War in the War on Terror, FOREIGN AFF., Jan.-Feb. 
2004 (arguing that it should not be considered a war, but a police action against a 
criminal organization); Ruth Wedgwood, A1 Qaeda, Terrorism, and Military Com- 
missions, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 328 (2002) (characterizing the devastation inflicted in 
the September 11 attacks and the official response by NATO and the United States 
as emblematic of a war). 
13 Jordan J. Paust, War and Enemy Status after 9/11,28 YALE J .  INT'L L. 325, 
326-27 (2003) (noting that A1 Qaeda does not even meet the definition of insur- 
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Qaeda, and other individuals and groups, like Islamic Jihad, 
that are allied with Al Qaeda.l5 
Part I of this Article discusses the practices of the racial 
profiling that the federal government has put in place after Sep- 
tember 11. Part I1 of this Article discusses a history and analy- 
sis of racial profiling both in the street crime context and in the 
context of counter-terrorism. Part I11 of this article discusses 
combating a terrorist organization like Al Qaeda and the link 
both domestically and internationally to racial profiling of 
Arabs, Muslims, Sikhs, and South Asians. 
Despite strong words from high-ranking government ofi- 
cials that the Executive Branch is not engaged in ethnic profil- 
ing of Arabs and Muslims,l6 the policies and practices of 
gency and, consequently, a "war" is not the proper legal description of an effort to 
eradicate it). But see Wedgwood, supra note 12, at 328. 
14 See Ruth Wedgwood, Cause for Alarm: Legal Action Can Bring Victories, 
But Preventing Terrorism Calls for Tougher Tactics, WASH. POST, June 3,2001, a t  
B01, available at 2001 WL 17633356 (arguing that the courts and law enforcement 
alone cannot prevail against A1 Qaeda and its allies). 
15 See Richard Falk, Fawaz Gerges, George Lopez, William Nash, & Ruth 
Wedgwood, The "War" on Terrorism: What Rules Apply? (New York Forum #I), 
Dec. 17, 2001, available at http://www.cceia.org/viewMedia.php/prmTemplateID/8/ 
prmID/147?PHPSESSID (Professor Falk defer;ds the notion of denominating the 
conflict as a war, particularly against Afghanistan, but adds, 'We also need to rely 
on the 'Just War' framework to assess whether the kinds of undertakings that 
occur in the post-Afghanistan phase of this war have any persuasive relationship 
to the threat that was posed by the attack on September 11th and by the Osama 
bin Laden visionary terrorism that lies behind it. In that sense, I am deeply op- 
posed to any extension of military operations beyond Afghanistan. Any post-Af- 
ghanistan efforts to address this threat of mega-terrorism should rely on a law 
enforcement approach - that is, police cooperation with foreign governments, try- 
ing to interdict financial support, trying to use covert operations - in order to 
weaken the capacity of other portions of the global terrorist network to function"). 
But see Paust, supra note 13, at 326-27 (criticizing the characterization of the con- 
flict against A1 Qaeda as a "warn). 
16 David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. L. REV. 953 (2002). 
To those who pit Americans against immigrants and citizens against non- 
citizens, to those who scare peace-loving people with phantoms of lost lib- 
erty, my message is this: Your tactics only aid terrorists, for they erode 
our national unity and diminish our resolve. They give ammunition to 
America's enemies, and pause to America's friends. 
Id. (quoting Attorney General John Ashcroft's Dec. 6, 2001 address). I am in- 
debted to Professor Cole for his leadership and inspiration in this area. 
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Executive departments belie that claim. Specifically, those de- 
partments have carried out the following: (1) Arresting in mass 
Arab and Muslim immigrants,l7 and carrying out Preventive 
Detention;lS (2) Conducting secret (closed) immigration hear- 
ings for these detainees;lg (3) (a) Requiring all male Arab and 
Muslim nationals sixteen and older who have been residing 
here with student visas, visitors' visas, and other temporary 
visas to personally register with the Immigration and Naturali- 
zation Service ("INS");20 and (b) Requiring that visitors from 
17 Id. at 961. Leadership Conference on Civil Rights and Education Fund, 
Wrong Then, Wrong Now, Racial Profiling before and after September 11, 2001, a t  
23, available at http:llwww.civilrights.org/publications/reports/racial~profiling~re- 
port.pdf [hereinafter Civil Rights and Education Fund] (noting that after Septem- 
ber 11, the government "detained hundreds-perhaps thousands-of Arabs, South 
Asians and Muslims on suspicion of terrorist activity.") Id. (citing Center for Nat'l 
Security Studies v. Dep't of Justice, 215 F. Supp. 2d 94 (D.C. Cir. 2002)). 
18 Professor Cole estimated that 2,000 Arab and Muslim immigrants had been 
held for months without charge by April 2002. See Cole, supra note 16, a t  960. See 
also Center for Nat'l Security Studies v. Dep't of Justice, 331 F.3d 918, 921 (D.C. 
Cir. June 17,2003) (noting that in the course of the post Sept. 11 investigation, the 
government interviewed over 1,000 persons, detained 700 of them for violation of 
immigration laws, 134 on federal criminal charges, and an undisclosed number as 
material witnesses); Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Treatment of Immi- 
grants, Refugees, and Minorities, in A YEAR OF LOSS, at http:l/www.lchr.org/us- 
lawAossAoss~ch3a.htm (last visited June 20, 2003). 
19 See Civil Rights and Education Fund, supra note 17, at 23-25. See also Cole, 
supra note 16, at 962. 
20 Registration of Certain Nonimmigrant Aliens From Designated Countries, 
67 Fed. Reg. 67,766 (Nov. 6, 2002), available at 2002 W L  31464912. This order, 
issued by Attorney General John Ashcroft, required males from certain Muslim 
countries to register in person at an INS office by December 16, 2002. The order 
covered those males who are were over the age of sixteen and who held tourist 
visas, business visitor visas, student visas and other temporary visas. The order 
applied to "nationals or citizens of Iran, Iraq, Libya, Sudan or Syria . . . ." Id. An 
"alien" who does not comply with this order commits an immigration law violation 
and is subject to deportation. Id. ('A willful failure to comply with the require- 
ments of this Notice constitutes a failure to maintain nonimmigrant status under 
section 237(a)(l)(C)(i) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(l)(C)(i)"). See 8 CFR 214.l(f). 
See also Sharon L. Davies, Profiling Terror, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 45, 51 11.27 
(2003). Attorney General Ashcroft issued similar orders covering nationals from 
other Arab and Muslim countries as well as from North Korea. See Registration of 
Certain Nonimmigrant Aliens from Designated Countries, 67 Fed. Reg. 70,526 
(Nov. 22, 2002) (requiring males, sixteen and older, from Afghanistan, Algeria, 
Bahrain, Eritrea, Lebanon, Morocco, North Korea, Oman, Qatar, Somalia, Tunisia, 
United Arab Emirates and Yemen to register by January 10, 2003). See also Re- 
gistration of Certain Nonimmigrant Aliens from Designated Countries, 67 Fed. 
Reg. 77,136 (Dec. 16, 2002); Registration of Certain Nonimmigrant Aliens from 
Designated Countries, 67 Fed. Reg. 77,642 (ordering male nationals 16 and above, 
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Arab and other selected countries be fingerprinted, photo- 
graphed, and subject to an interrogation under oath at  ports of 
entry;21 (4) Changing priority for deporting "aliens," namely, 
the INS'S seeking to deport 6,000 from Arab countries first, 
ahead of the 314,000 foreign nationals who have absconded;22 
(5) The Justice Department's interviewing 5,000-8,000 young 
immigrant men based solely on their age, date of arrival, and 
country from which they have come, all being either Arabs or 
Muslims;23 and (6) Enlisting state and local police to enforce 
immigration laws, thereby implicitly encouraging those police 
forces to engage in more traditional racial profiling of Arabs, 
Muslims, Sikhs and South Asians, namely, by stopping for 
questioning and investigation Arab appearing drivers and 
pedestrians.24 All these policies and practices will be examined 
in turn. 
A. Mass Arrests and Preventive Detention of Arab and 
Muslim Immigrants 
Within a matter of weeks after September 11, the federal 
government began to  arrest a large number of primarily Arab 
from Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, to register between January 13,2003 and Febru- 
ary 21, 2003). 
21 Civil Rights and Education Fund, supra note 17, a t  25-26. 
22 DOJ Focusing on Removal of 6,000 Men for A1 Qaeda Haven Countries, in 
79 INTERPRETER RELEASES 115,115-16 (Jan. 21,2002); Cole, supra note 16, a t  975 
(citing Dan Eggen & Cheryl W. Thompson, U.S. Seeks Thousands of Fugitive De- 
portees; Middle Eastern Men Are Focus of Search, WASH. POST, Jan. 8,2002, a t  Al). 
23 Civil Rights and Education Fund, supra note 17, at 24-25. The mandatory 
interrogation program required Arab men who had entered the United States on 
non-immigrant visas before January 1,2000 to report to the Department of Home- 
land Security for questioning. (Non-immigrant visas include student visas, tourist 
visas, business visas, and other temporary visas). Id. Although Attorney General 
John Ashcroft apparently stated that the interviews were to be "voluntary and 
friendly," a Department of Justice Memorandum authorized holding "interested" 
individuals on bond. Id. at 25 n.104 (citing Memo Adds to Suspicions of Zmmi- 
grants on Interviews, N.Y. TIMES,  NOV. 29, 2001). This is not to mention continued 
incommunicado indefinite detention of Arabs and Muslims in Guantanamo Bay. 
The focus of this discussion, however, is on the treatment of Arabs and Muslims in 
the United States. 
24 See Civil Rights and Education Fund, supra note 17, a t  22-23. See also 
DOJ Focusing on Removal of 6,000 Men for A1 Qaeda Haven Countries, supra note 
22, at 116 (quoting the Arab American Anti-Discrimination Committee ("ADC")) 
("The ADC stressed that [the government] has the right to remove persons who are 
not in the country legally but said that it is 'unconscionable' to proceed 'based on a 
hierarchy that is ethnically defined'"). 
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and Muslim  immigrant^.^^ The federal government stopped re- 
porting the number when it reached 1,147,26 but at least 1,200 
persons were arrested and later charged with immigration vio- 
lati0ns.~7 One scholar estimates that 2,000 had been arrested 
by April 2002.28 A significant additional number of individuals 
were held as "material witnesses."29 Only a handful of the de- 
tentions ultimately resulted in arrests for terrorist offenses.30 
Many of the detainees were held for weeks or months without 
charge.31 Few were permitted initial access to c0unsel.3~ Some 
against whom orders of deportation or voluntary departure had 
already been served and entered were still held by the INS, 
even though they had been scheduled to  leave the country.33 
Preventive detention generally is not permitted in the United 
States, but it was essentially carried out against some of these 
detainees: 
25 Susan M. Akram & Kevin R. Johnson, "Migration Regulation Goes Local: 
The Role of States in  U.S. Immigration Policy:" Race, Civil Rights, and Immigra- 
tion Law after September 11, 2001: The Targeting of Arabs and Muslims, 58 
N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 295, 331 (2002) (citing, inter alia, David E. Rovella, 
Clock Ticks on 9 / 1 1  Detentions, NAT'L L. J., NOV. 5,  2001, at Al). 
26 See Cole, supra note 16, at 960. 
27 See Chishti & Meissner, supra note 7 ,  at  1194. 
28 Cole, supra note 16, at 960. 
29 See Akram & Johnson, supra note 25, at 327 (noting that a large number of  
Arab and Muslim citizens were put into custody as "material witnessesn i n  the 
aftermath o f  9/11). One study found that "nearly 50 people" have been detained as 
material witnesses since September 11. See Chishti & Meissner, supra note 7 ,  at  
1195. 
30 See Chishti & Meissner, supra note 7 ,  at 1194-95. 
31 Cole, supra note 16, at 962 (citing Amnesty Int'l, Amnesty International's 
Concerns Regarding Post September 11 Detentions in  the U S A  (Mar. 14, 20021, 
available at  http://web.amnesty.org1library/Index/ENGAMR510442002); Dan Eg- 
gen, Delays Cited in  Charging Detainees; With Legal Latitude, INS Sometimes 
Took Weeks, WASH. POST, Jan. 15,2002, at A l ;  Dan Eggen, Long Wait for Filing of 
Charges Common for Sept. 11 Detainees; Delays Reasonable, INS  Officials Say,  
WASH. POST, JAN. 19,2002, at  A12). See also Chishti & Meissner, supra note 7 ,  at 
1194 (noting that o f  the 406 detainees from whom information was available, over 
half were held "for more than five weeks. Almost nine percent were detained for 
more than nine months before being released or repatriated"). 
32 See Chishti & Meissner, supra note 7 ,  at 1194 ("Many of these detainees 
had severe problems notifying or communicating with their family members and 
lawyers or arranging for representation at all"). 
33 Cole, supra note 16, at 964. See also Chishti & Meissner, supra note 7 ,  at 
1194 ("Of the detainees for whom such information was available, approximately 
52 percent were believed to  be subject to a Federal Bureau o f  Investigation (''FBIn) 
hold, preventing their repatriation for weeks or months even after they were or- . 
dered removed from the U.S.  and did not appeal"). 
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[Of all those arrested, 7521 were charged with immigration viola- 
tions. These so- called "special interestn immigration detainees 
were presumed guilty of links to terrorism and incarcerated for 
months until the government "cleared" them of such connections. 
By February 2002, the Department of Justice acknowledged that 
most of the original "special interest" detainees were no longer of 
interest to its anti-terrorist efforts, and none were indicted for 
crimes related to the September 11 attacks. Most were deported 
for visa  violation^.^^ 
One study of the detentions revealed that more than one-third 
of the detainees for whom information was available came from 
either Egypt or Pakistan.35 The researchers were unable to find 
any rational basis for targeting nationals from these two coun- 
t1-ies.3~ Perhaps more troubling, the researchers found that the 
arrest of foreign nationals from Muslim countries did not ap- 
pear to be based on an official policy of racial profiling but upon 
private citizens, engaging in racial profiling themselves, who 
phoned in tips to law enforcement agents about Muslims or 
Muslim looking individuals living in their communities or 
places of work.37 Apparently, law enforcement personnel acqui- 
esced in the practice of racial profiling by picking up those 
whom citizens had identified.38 
B. Conducting Secret (Closed) Immigration Hearings for the 
Arab and Muslim Immigrants Who Were Arrested and 
Detained 
The public, the press, and family members have been ex- 
cluded from virtually all immigration hearings conducted for 
these immigrants.39 Before September 11, immigration judges 
had the discretion to close immigration hearings on a case-by- 
34 Alison Parker & Jamie Fellner, Above the Law: Executive Power after Sep- 
tember 11 in the United States, in H* RIGHTS WATCH WORLD REPORT 2004 
(20041, available at http://hnv.org/wr2k4/8.htm#_Toc58744957. 
35 Chishti & Meissner, supra note 7, a t  1194. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. The study also showed that the "majority of noncitizens detained since 
September 11 . . . had spouses, children, or other family relationships in the U.S." 
Id. 
39 See Cole, supra note 16, a t  961. See also Memorandum from the Chief Im- 
migration Judge, infia note 41 and accompanying Instructions to Immigration 
Judges. 
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case basis. Generally, immigration hearings were not closed.40 
The Attorney General, however, changed the rule, requiring im- 
migration judges to close the proceedings at  the request of the 
p r o s e ~ u t o r . ~ ~  Apparently, the Justice Department ordered all 
the prosecutors to make such a request in these post September 
11 ~ a s e s . 4 ~  Attorneys representing the immigrants during the 
closed hearings reported that no classified information had 
been introduced in the hearing~.~3 Although due process is 
more limited in immigration hearings than in a criminal trial, 
the principle of public trials and hearings is f ~ n d a m e n t a l . ~ ~  It 
should only be deviated from in cases of extreme necessity. The 
blanket approach here, where virtually every one of these immi- 
grants had a closed proceeding, on its face violates that princi- 
ple, particularly absent any apparent demonstrated need for 
the closures in all these ~ a s e s . 4 ~  
40 See North Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 205 F. Supp. 2d 288, 299- 
300 (D. N.J. 2002) (noting that the immigration regulations promulgated since 
1964 created a presumption that deportation hearings would be open) (citing 8 
C.F.R. § 242.16(a) and 8 C.F.R. 5 3.271, rev'd, 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 20021, cert. 
denied 123 S. Ct. 2215 (2003) (holding that the INS may close so-called "special 
interest" immigration deportation hearings). 
41 Memorandum from Michael Creppy, Chief Immigration Law Judge, to All 
Immigration Judges (Sept. 21, 2001), in 78 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1836 (Dec. 3, 
2001). The memorandum states as follows: "[Tlhe Attorney General has imple- 
mented additional security procedures for certain cases in the Immigration Court. 
Those procedures require us to hold the hearings individually, to close the hear- 
i n g [ ~ ]  to the public, and to avoid discussing the case or otherwise disclosing any 
information about the case to anyone outside the Immigration Court." Id. (empha- 
sis added). The instructions that were subsequently issued state in part as follows: 
"The courtroom must be closed for these cases . . . no visitors, no family, no press." 
Instructions for Cases Requiring Additional Security, in 78 INTERPRETER RELEASES 
1837 (Dec. 3, 2001). 
42 See id.; but see Akram & Johnson, supra note 25, at 321 (noting that by 
1999, the government used secret evidence in 25 removal proceedings brought 
against ~ r a b  and Muslim immigrants). 
43 See Cole, supra note 16, a t  961. 
44 See id.  See also Richmond Newspapers Inc., v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 
(1980). 
45 The Sixth Circuit noted as follows: 
Nothing in the Creppy directive counsels that it is limited to "a small seg- 
ment of particularly dangerous individuals." In fact, the Government so 
much as argues that certain non-citizens known to have no links to terror- 
ism will be designated "special interest7' cases. Supposedly, closing a more 
targeted class would allow terrorists to draw inferences from which hear- 
ings are open and which are closed. 
Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681,692 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding that INS 
" 
may not close "special interest" immigration deportation cases). 
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Aside from closing the immigration hearings, the Justice 
Department has conducted the proceedings against these immi- 
grants in virtually unparalleled ~ecrecy.~6 "Chief Immigration 
Judge Michael Creppy has instructed immigration judges not to  
list the cases on the public docket, and to refuse to confirm or 
- 
deny that they even exist."47 The Justice Department has re- 
fused to disclose the names of those it detained.48 The United 
States Supreme Court has refused to grant certiorari in a case 
challenging that decision.49 
1. Requiring Arab and Muslim Immigrants who have been 
residing here with student visas, visitors visas, and 
other temporary visas to personally register with the 
immigration authorities 
During the Iran Hostage crisis, all Iranian students study- 
ing in the United States were required to  report to the INS.50 
As a result, the INS deported a significant number of Irani- 
a n ~ . ~ ~  The Justice Department issued a similar order, under its 
"Special Registration" Program, part of the National Security 
Entry-Exit Registration System ("NSEERS"),52 requiring that 
the following personally appear at  Immigration and Naturaliza- 
tion offices: foreign born males, sixteen years of age or older, 
from almost exclusively Arab and Muslim countries, who hold 
student visas, visitors' visas, and other temporary visas.53 Ap- 
46 See Instructions for Cases Requiring Additional Security, supra note 41, a t  
1837 ("This restriction on information includes confirming or denying whether 
such a case is on the docket or scheduled for a hearing. . . You should instruct all 
courtroom personnel, including both court employees and contract interpreters, 
that they are not to discuss the case with anyone"). 
47 Id. See also Cole, supra note 16, a t  961 (citing Memorandum from Chief 
Immigration Judge Michael Creppy, supra note 41). 
4s See Cole, supra note 16, at 960. 
49 North Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 20021, 
cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 2215 (2003). 
50 8 C.F.R. 4 214.5 (1981). See also Narenji v. Civiletti, 617 F.2d 745 (D.C. 
Cir. 1979) (upholding INS regulations requiring Iranian students to report to the 
INS). 
51 See Shoaee v. INS, 704 F.2d 1079 (9th Cir. 1983) (upholding an Iranian 
student's deporation). 
52 Registration of Certain Nonimmigrant Aliens From Designated Countries, 
67 Fed. Reg. 67,766, 67,7667 (Nov. 6, 2002). 
53 See State Department Press Releases and Documents, New Entry-Exit Sys- 
tem to Focus on Individuals, Not 'Broad Categories,' FED. NEWS & INFO. DISPATCH, 
Dec. 2, 2003, available at 2003 WL 64739209. There are three components to Na- 
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parently, the Justice Department planned to have the program 
cover all foreign visitors, but it started with Iran, Iraq, Syria, 
Sudan, Libya and North Korea, all Arab and Muslim countries 
except North K0rea.5~ The Department established four groups 
from the following countries that were required to come in and 
register at designated dates: "[I] Iraq, Iran, Libya, Sudan and 
Syria; [I11 Afghanistan, Algeria, Bahrain, Eritrea, Lebanon, Mo- 
rocco North Korea, Oman, Qatar, Somalia, Tunisia, United 
Arab Emirates and Yemen; [IIII Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, 
Jordan and Kuwait; and [IVI Saudi Arabia and Pakistan."55 
The first registration deadline was in December 2OO2;56 
the registration deadline for the first two groups ended Feb- 
ruary 7, 2003.57 The third group's deadline was March 21, 
2003,58 and the fourth group's deadline was April 25, 2003.59 
tional Security Entry-Exit Registration System: the "Special Registration" pro- 
gram described above; the "Point of Entry Registration," [hereinafter POE] for 
those who are at the point of entering the country; and "Exit-Departure" controls 
for those who are leaving the country. Id. a t  1. The POE program is described 
infia notes 65 to 71 and accompanying text. See also Davies, supra note 20, a t  51 
11.27 (2003) (noting that Attorney General John Ashcroft "instituted special regis- 
tration requirements known as the National Security Entry-Exit Registration Sys- 
tem (NSEERS) that require select individuals to be fingerprinted, photographed, 
and interviewed under oath a t  United States ports-of-entry. These registration 
requirements were subsequently extended to nationals of certain designated coun- 
tries who had already been permitted to enter the United States . . . . These Regis- 
tration requirements affect non-immigrant aliens from four groups of countries: 
Iraq, Iran, Libya, Sudan and Syria; Afghanistan, Algeria, Bahrain, Eritrea, Leba- 
non, Morocco North Korea, Oman, Qatar, Somalia, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates 
and Yemen; Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Jordan and Kuwait; and Saudi Arabia 
and Pakistan"). Professor Davies also notes that the FBI appears to be openly 
investigating Arab and Muslims in the United States. See id. (citing Eric Licht- 
blau, FBI Tells Ofices to Count Local Muslims and Mosques, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 
2003, at A13). 
54 See Davies, supra note 20, at 51 n.27. 
55 Id. See also State Department Press Release on New Exit-Entry System, 
supra note 53, a t  2. 
56 Registration of Certain Nonimmigrant Aliens From Designated Countries, 
67 Fed. Reg. 67,766, 67,767 (Nov. 6, 2002). 
57 Registration of Certain Nonimmigrant Aliens From Designated Countries, 
67 Fed. Reg. 77,136, 77,137 (Dec. 16, 2002). See also Permission for Certain Non- 
immigrant Aliens From Designated Countries to Register in a Timely Fashion, 68 
Fed. Reg. 2,366 (Jan. 16, 2003) (reopening the registration period for the first two 
groups, extending the time for them to register to Feb. 7, 2003). 
58 Registration of Certain Nonimmigrant Aliens from Designated Counties, 
68 Fed. Reg. 2,363-03, 2,364 (Jan. 16, 2003) (requiring the specified nationals from 
Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Jordan and Kuwait to register by March 28, 2003). 
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Although the Justice Department initially assured those 
subject to the call-in registration program that the purpose of 
the registration was to track foreigners and to obtain leads on 
terrorists, the Department alio used the registration process to 
determine if those registering had violated immigration regula- 
tions. Apparently, 500 to 1000 individuals "were detained" af- 
ter registering on December 10,2003 "in the Los AnglesIOrange 
County area alone . . . . "60 
The program, however, apparently yielded little in the way 
of arrests for terrorist crimes. See table below. 
a. Mandatory Registration and Detention Data 
Number of Arab and Muslim Immigrants 82,58161 
Registered 
Number of Notices of Appear Issued (charging 13,153 
immigration law Violations) 
Number of Arab and Muslim Immigrants 2,761 
Detained Overall 
Number Deported (although BICS noted that 2 
many have taken Voluntary departure and 
many are still in proceedings) 
Number Charged with Terrorism Related Crimes 062 
Although the ethnic profiling of Arabs and Muslims may have 
yielded intelligence63 (but not arrests), these figures do suggest 
that the crude tool of profiling may not be greatly advancing the 
government's cause against Al Qaeda and its allies.G4 
59 Registration of Certain Nonimmigrant Aliens from Designated Countries, 
68 Fed. Reg. 8,046, 8,047 (Feb. 19, 2003) (extending the previous deadline). See 
also State Department Press Release on New Exit-Entry System, supra note 53, a t  
2. 
60 Id. Such a policy may be counter-productive for other reasons. Individuals 
who have information about terrorist activity, but who have minor immigration 
infractions may decide not to register or to cooperate with authorities. Id. 
61 As of December 2,2003 when the Department of State announced that the 
Special Registration Program was to end, 83,519 individuals had been registered. 
State Department Press Release on New Entry-Exit System, supra note 53, a t  2. 
62 Data from Asian American Legal Defense Fund, citing to the Bureau of 
Citizenship and Immigration Services (formerly part of the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service), current as of May 11, 2003. 
63 I t  is not known what intelligence leads, if any, have come from these vari- 
ous programs. 
64 Michael Janofsky, 9/11 Panel Calls Policies On Immigration Ineffective, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17,2004, at A8 (9111 Commission's preliminary report concluded, 
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2. Requiring that visitors from Arab and other selected 
countries be fingerprinted, photographed, and subject to 
an interrogation under oath at  ports-of-entry 
A second aspect of the National Security Entry-Exit Regis- 
tration System required selected individuals at various points 
of entry to  be fingerprinted, photographed, and subject to inter- 
rogation under oath.65 Again this program targeted foreigners 
from the same twenty-four Arab and Muslim countries, with the 
addition of North Korea.66 These controls applied to students, 
- - 
tourists, business visitors, and other temporary visa holders.67 
After considerable protest on the part of the Arab-American 
community and others, the Department of Homeland Security 
("DHS") decided to abolish the mandatory annual re-registra- 
tion requirement, under the Special Registration Program or 
under the Port of Entry ("POE") program, effective December 2, 
2003.68 Department of Homeland Security Deputy Secretary, 
Asa Hutchinson said that DHS "'will utilize a more tailored sys- 
tem that is individual-specific rather than the broad categories 
[of people] by geography."'69 By September 30, 2003, 177,260 
people had registered with the NSEERS program as a whole. 
among other things, that these programs racially profiling Arabs and Muslims in 
the United States were.a failure). 
65 See Davies, supra note 20, at 51 n.27. 
66 See id. See also supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
67 These measures were subsequently expanded under the US-VISIT program 
to include other countries, Brazil being among the countries on the list. Irate a t  
these security measures, a Brazilian judge ordered that all visitors from the Un- 
tied States to Brazil be subject to the same treatment. See Audrey Hudson & S.A. 
Miller, U.S. Requires Fingerprints, Photos From Foreign Visitors, WASH. TIMES, 
Jan. 6, 2004, at A01. The U.S. Visit program requires biometric identification of 
all visitors and non-immigrants, including foreigners entering the United States to 
study here. Implementation of the United States Visitor and Immigrant Status 
Indicator Technology Program ("US-Visit"); Biometric Requirements, 69 Fed. Reg. 
468,468 (Jan. 5, 2004). The DHS plans to expand this program to include visitors 
from all countries. I t  appears that it essentially will supplant NSEERS. Id. a t  
476. 
66 State Dep't Press Release on New Exit-Entry Procedures, supra note 53, a t  
1; Suspending the 30-Day and Annual Interview Requirements From the Special 
Registration Process for Certain Nonimmigrants, 68 Fed. Reg. 67,578 (Dec. 2, 
2003) (to be codified as 8 C.F.R. Part 264) ("Supplementary Information" section 
for this interim rule states that DHS "will use a more tailored system in which it 
will notify individual aliens of future registration requirements"). By the way, the 
DHS absorbed the INS on March 1,2003. 
69 See State Dep't Press Release on New Exit-Entry Procedures, supra note 
53, at 1. 
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They will not have to re-register annually as had been required 
under the original program.70 Exit controls, however, for these 
individuals remain in effect.71 
C. Changing priority for deporting "aliens," namely, the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service's seeking to 
deport 6,000 from Arab countries first, ahead of the 
314,000 foreign nationals who have absconded 
At first glance, the so-called "Absconder Apprehension Ini- 
tiative" appears to be a sound enforcement tactic. Of the esti- 
mated 314,000 foreign born from nations around the world who 
have removal orders against them, the government has 
targeted the approximately 6,000 from Arab and Muslim coun- 
tries first.72 The September 11 hijackers and Al Qaeda were 
Arab and Muslim. The argument runs that other members of 
Al Qaeda might be among the 6,000 from these selected "Al 
Qaeda harboring" countries.73 
The difficulty is that the targeted persons are being singled 
out solely because of their nationality. This kind of racial profil- 
ing has apparently yielded little, if any, intelligence or arrests 
for terrorism offenses, when employed in the call-in registration 
program or in the "voluntary" interview pr0grarn.7~ The Ab- 
sconder Initiative has apparently been equally fruitless. A re- 
port of the Presidential commission investigating the 
September 11 attacks expressly found as follows: ''We have 
not learned that any of the absconders were deported under a 
terrorism statute, prosecuted for terrorist-related crimes or 
70 See Suspending the 30-Day and Annual Interview Requirements From the 
Special Registration Process for Certain Nonimmigrants, supra note 68, at 67,581. 
71 Id. a t  67,580. See also Kathleen Taylor, Editorial, SEATTLE POST INTELLI- 
GENCER, Dec. 18, 2003 (noting that temporary immigrants from the named 25 
countries have to leave the United States from designated points of entry and must 
register upon leaving the country). 
72 Middle Eastern "Absconders" to be Rounded Up, 7 BENDER'S IMMIGR. BULL. 
No. 5, Mar. 1, 2002, a t  264. It is estimated that approximately 1,000 of the 6,000 
absconders have felony convictions. They will be targeted for deportation first; 
then the rest will follow. Id. 
73 American Immigration Lawyers Association, Boiling the Frog Slowly: Exec- 
utive Branch Actions Since September 11, 2001, 7 BENDER'S IMMIGR. BULL. NO. 20, 
Oct. 15, 2002, a t  1237. INS Commissioner Ziglar announced the initiative in De- 
cember 2001. Id. 
74 See infra note 140 and accompanying text. 
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linked in any way to t e r r ~ r i s m . " ~ ~  As some commentators have 
noted, including the former Commissioner of the INS, "This [ab- 
sconder initiative] has marginal security benefits, while further 
equating national origin with dangerou~ness."~6 Furthermore, 
there is every reason to believe that Arabs and Muslims living 
here or abroad will see this as yet another example of American 
government blatantly discriminating against individuals with 
Arab and Islamic backgrounds.77 
D. The Justice Department Task Force's interviewing 5,000- 
8,000 young immigrant men based solely on their age, 
date of arrival, and country from which they have 
come, all being either Arabs or Muslims 
The Justice Department also initiated a Task Force pro- 
gram to "voluntarily" interview 5,000 immigrant men, between 
the ages of eighteen and thirty-three, who came almost exclu- 
sively from Arab or Muslim countries and who entered the 
United States after January 1, 2000.78 The program was ex- 
panded to include an additional 3,000. The Task Force was 
composed not only of Justice Department personnel, but also of 
local and state police 0Ecers.~9 Nominally to obtain leads on 
terrorism both here and abroad, a Justice Department memo 
suggests that the voluntary interviews also had the purpose of 
potentially arresting suspicious interviewees and those who had 
-~ ~ 
75 Janofsky, supra note 64, a t  A8. The Commission reported that as  of "early 
2003, 1,139 had been apprehended, a group that included 803 who had been de- 
ported, 224 who were awaiting deportation and 45 who were prosecuted on other 
criminal charges . . . ." Id. 
76 Chishti & Meissner, supra note 7, a t  1195 . 
77 Cam Simpson, F lym McRoberts and Liz Sly, Immigration Crackdown 
Shatters Muslims' Lives, CHIC. TRIB., Nov. 16, 2003, a t  C1. Cfi Geneive Abdo & 
E.A. Torriero, Spy Charges Dropped, but Fear Remains; Chaplain's Kin Feel 'Like 
the Enemy', CHIC. TRIB., May 3, 2004, at 1 (although espionage charges were 
dropped against Army Capt. James Yee for allegedly mishandling classified docu- 
ments in Guantanamo Bay, Muslims feel targeted by the government). 
78 Akram & Johnson, supra note 25, a t  334 (citing DOJ Orders Incentives, 
'Voluntary' Interviews ofAliens to Obtain Info on Terrorists; Foreign Students, Visa 
Processing Under State Dept. Scrutiny, in 78 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1816,1817-17 
(2001)). 
79 DOJ Orders Incentives, 'Voluntary' Interviews of Aliens to Obtain Info on 
Terrorists; Foreign Students, Visa Processing Under State Dept. Scrutiny, supra 
note 78, a t  1817-18. 
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violated immigration laws.80 Apparently, approximately 
twenty have been arrested as a result of the inter~iews.8~ 
Before the interviews, the authorities apparently lacked either 
probable cause or reasonable suspicion that any of these immi- 
grants had committed immigration violations, let alone that 
they were engaged in terrorist crimes or knew about terrorist 
activities. The basis of the interviews was the nationality of the 
targeted persons, plus their gender, age and time of entry. 
E.  Enlisting state and local police in  immigration 
enforcement, implicitly encouraging those police forces 
to engage in  more traditional racial profiling of 
Arabs, Muslims, Sikhs and South Asians, namely, 
by stopping for questioning and investigating Arab 
appearing drivers and pedestrians82 
Before September 11, state and local police were generally 
precluded from enforcing the civil provisions of immigration 
80 Akram & Johnson, supra note 25, at 334 (citing Memorandum from the 
Deputy Attorney General, to all United States Attorneys and all Members of the 
Anti-terrorism Task Forces (Nov. 9, 2001), reprinted in DOJ Orders Incentives, 
"Voluntary" Interviews of Aliens to Obtain Info on Terrorists, Foreign Students, 
Visa Processing Under State Dept. Scrutiny, supra note 78, a t  app. The memoran- 
dum states in relevant part as follows: 'While the primary purpose of these inter- 
views is not to ascertain the legality of the individuals' immigration status, the 
federal responsibility to enforce the immigration laws, as exercised by the Immi- 
gration and Naturalization Service is an important one. Therefore, if you suspect 
that a particular individual may be in violation of the federal immigration laws, 
you should call the INS representative on your Anti-Terrorism Task Force or the 
INS officials a t  the closest Law Enforcement Support Center. Those officials will 
advise you whether the individual is in violation of the immigration laws and 
whether he should be detained." Id. a t  1829, 1830. 
81 Civil Rights and Education Fund, supra note 17, at 24-25. The approxi- 
mately 20 who were detained were held for immigration violations, not for terror- 
ist linked offenses. Id. The Department planned on interviewing approximately 
5,000 in 2001 and 3,000 in 2002; approximately 90 percent appeared. Id. Al- 
though it is not known whether any useful leads concerning terrorist activity were 
obtained from those who reported, there is little reported evidence to suggest that 
the questioning of Arab men provided substantial intelligence on terrorists. Id. 
Some police departments refused to participate in the interrogations, because of 
concerns about racial profiling. See id. n.106 (citing Fox Butterfield, Police are 
Split on Questioning of Mideast Men, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 2001, at B7) (quoting 
the Seattle chief of police who states that racial profiling was a sensitive problem 
because "[wle don't want to harm relationships with community members that we 
have worked for years to build [since] [wle depend on information that these people 
bring to us when they come to trust us"). 
82 See Civil Rights and Education Fund, supra note 17, at 22-23. 
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laws.83 Reasons for discouraging local policing in this area in- 
cluded the complexity of immigration law, an area that is gener- 
ally outside a police officer's training and knowledge, and the 
risk of discriminatory enforcement of the law against people of 
color and other "foreign looking" individuals.S4 The Justice De- 
partment, however, changed that policy, enlisting the aid of 
state and local police to enforce the immigration laws.85 For ex- 
ample, the Justice Department added to the FBI's National 
Crime Information ("NCIC") Database, the names of more than 
83 See Kevin Johnson, September 11 and Mexican Immigrants: Collateral 
Damage Comes Home, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 849, 863 n.90 (2003) (citing DeCanas v. 
Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 354 (1976) ("Power to  regulate immigration is unquestionably 
exclusively a federal power") (citations omitted)); see, e.g., League of United Latin 
Am. Citizens v .  Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (holding that most o f  
Proposition 187, a California law seeking to  effectively regulate undocumented im- 
migration, was preempted by federal law). But see Peter J. Spiro, The States and 
Immigration in  a n  Era of  Demi-Sovereignties, 35 VA. J .  INT'L L. 121 (1994) (con- 
tending that states should have an increased role in immigration regulation). See 
also Ignatius Bau, Cities of Refuge: No Federal Preemption of Ordinances Restrict- 
ing Local Government Cooperation with the INS ,  7 LA RAZA L. J. 50, 66 (1994) 
(citing a 1989 Memorandum o f  Understanding between the INS and the City o f  
San Francisco, agreeing that the San Francisco police will not enforce the federal 
immigration law). But see Paul Smith, An Argument Against Mandatory Report- 
ing of Undocumented Immigrants, 29 COLUM. J .  L. SOC. PROB. 147 (1995) (noting 
that although generally prohibited from enforcing the  civil provisions o f  the Immi- 
gration and Naturalization Act, there exists no constitutional preemption for state 
and local police from enforcing the criminal provisions o f  the INA) (citing Gonzales 
v. City of Peoria, 722 F.2d 469, 475 (9th  Cir. 1983); Gates v .  Superior Court, 193 
Cal. App. 3d 205, 214-15 (1987); Hawley, The Powers of  Local Law Enforcement to 
Enforce Immigration Laws, 99-6 IMMIGRATION BRIEFINGS (June 1999). 
84 See Mithre J. Sandrasagra, U.S.: Rights Groups Fight Use in  Immigration 
Cases, INTER PRESS SERVICE, Dec. 18, 2003, available at  2003 WL 66986827; see 
also Linda Reyna Yanez & Alfonso Soto, Local Police Involvement in  the Enforce- 
ment of Immigration Law, 1 HISP. L. J. 9 ,  12 (1994) (noting that local police en- 
forcement risks violating the rights o f  United States citizens, legal residents, and 
aliens); Johnson, supra note 83, at 363-64 (noting patterns o f  the police abuse of  
undocumented immigrants). 
85 DOJ Legal Opinion Would Broaden Use of  State, Local Personnel in  Immi- 
gration Enforcement, in 79 INTERPRETER RELEASES 519 (Apr. 8,  2002) (noting that 
the DOJ Ofice o f  Legal Counsel is issuing an opinion permitting local police to 
enforce the civil provisions o f  the Immigration laws, reversing its 1996 opinion). 
See also Marie Taylor, Immigration Enforcement Post September 11, Safeguarding 
the Civil Rights of Middle Eastern American and Immigrant Communities, 17 
GEO. L. J. 63,91(2002) (citing Eric Schmidt, Ruling Clears Way to Use State Police 
in  Immigration Duty, N.Y. T IMES ,  Apr. 4 ,  2002, at  A15). The House is debating a 
bill that would expressly authorize state and local police to enforce immigration 
laws. See House Subcommittee Debates Local Enforcement of Immigration Laws 
under Proposed CLEAR Act, in 80 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1407 (Oct. 13, 2003); 
H.R. 2671, 149 Cong. Rec. H6463 (daily ed. July 9 ,  2003). 
Heinonline - -  16 Pace. Int'l L. Rev. 37 2004 
38 PACE INT'L L. REV. [Vol. 16:19 
300,000 "aliens" who remained in the country despite deporta- 
tion or removal orders.86 Local law enforcement personnel can 
access the NCIC.87 The INS Commissioner explained that this 
policy change would enable local and state police to help with 
"removal efforts."88 Furthermore, the Justice Department 
asked local police forces to help interview 8,000 Muslim males, 
as noted in the previous section.B9 
Although using the local police to enforce immigration reg- 
ulations in the wake of September 11 may appear superficially 
reasonable, such a policy raises serious questions.90 "Co-opting 
state and local police to make immigration arrests undermines 
public safety and encourages racial profiling."gl It discourages 
undocumented immigrants from coming forward to help the po- 
86 See INS Commissioner Announces Data Sharing Arrangement with the 
FBI, Other Security Measures, in 78 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1899 (Dec. 17, 2001) 
(citing Chris Adams, INS to Put in Federal Criminal Databases the Names of Peo- 
ple Ordered Deported, WALL ST. J., Dec. 6,  2001, at A22). 
87 Id. ("Sharing this information with the FBI will allow local law enforcement 
personnel to assist with removal effortsn). 
88 Id. 
as See Chishti & Meissner, supra note 7, a t  1195 ("Problems occurred [in the 
'voluntary in te~ iew '  program1 when poorly trained police officials were tasked to 
implement the programn). 
90 In testifying before Congress, Members of the Mexican Legal Defense Fund 
noted: 
Immigrants, generally, prefer not to draw attention to themselves from 
the government or the private sector even if they are here legally. This 
explains, in part, why Latino immigrants under-report when they are the 
victims of crime or when they are the victim of illegal civil practices, such 
as employment discrimination, unsafe working environments, or housing 
discrimination even though they experience these practices in significant 
numbers. Current trends post-9/11 to involve local law enforcement in en- 
forcing immigration laws, particularly civil laws, will only drive Latino 
immigrant communities further underground and make them less willing 
to provide information to law enforcement that would be helpful in solving 
crimes and resolving legal violations that affect not just Latinos but 
others with whom they work and live. I t  will also lead to less cooperation 
from immigrant communities with law enforcement searching for leads to 
fight terrorism. 
INS Interior Enforcement Strategy: Hearing Before the House Comm. on the Judi- 
ciary, Subcomm. on Immigration and Claims Interior Enforcement Strategy, 107th 
Cong. (June 19,2002) (statement of Marisa J. Demeo, Regional Counsel, and Aisha 
Qaasim, Legislative Staff Attorney, Mexican American Legal Defense and Educa- 
tional Fund (MALDEF)), available at 2002 WL 20318304 (emphasis added). 
91 Sandrasagra, supra note 84 (quoting Raul Yzaguirre, president and CEO of 
the National Council of La Raza). 
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lice solve crimes.g2 Numerous police departments, the National 
Association of Counties, and the National League of Cities have 
taken stands against using state and local police to make immi- 
gration arrests.93 
Unfortunately, there appears to be substantial evidence 
that state and local police are engaging in racial profiling of 
Arabs, Muslims, Sikhs, and South Asians.94 As in the case of 
profiling of Blacks and Latinos, many local police are appar- 
ently stopping Arab looking drivers pretextually, solely or in 
part because of their appearan~e .~~  Arab looking individuals 
are also being stopped or questioned in other places at least in 
part because of their ethnicity.96 
IV. RACIAL PROFILING: A HISTORY AND AN ANALYSIS 
A. September 11 as Justifying Racial Profiling 
Given the nationality of the authors of the September 11 
attacks, why should we not target immigrants and visitors from 
Arab and Muslim countries for investigation, prosecution, and 
deportation? After all, there may be other sleeper A1 Qaeda 
cells here in the United States.97 Furthermore, Arab, Muslims, 
and their organizations may be financing terror groups against 
us. 
92 See Johnson, supra note 83, at 864. 
93 Sandrasagra, supra note 84. 
94 See Teresa Watanabe, Anti-Muslim Incidents Rise, Study Finds; Group 
Says Hate Crimes and Harassment in California Tripled in 2003 from Previous 
Year, L.A. TIMES, May 3,2004, at  B1; Mary Beth Sheridan, Bias Against Muslims 
Up 70%; Radio Talk Shows, Iraq War Among Reasons, Study Finds, WASH. POST, 
May 3, 2004, at  A12. 
95 See Civil Rights and Education Fund, supra note 17, at 22-23 (discussing 
cases of "Driving while Arab (or Arab looking)"). 
96 See id. at  23. Aside from this local profiling, "flying while Arab," the profil- 
ing of Arab and Muslim airline passengers by private screeners and now govern- 
mental officials, has reached unprecedented heights. Id. at 27-28. See also Cham 
A. Chandrasekhar, Note & Comment: Flying While Brown: Federal Civil Rights 
Remedies to Post-9/11 Airline Racial Profiling of South Asians, 10 &IAN L. J. 215 
(2003). 
97 "[Ilf the people that are flying your airplanes into buildings are from the 
Middle East, you don't look for New Zealanders." Chandrasekhar, supra note 96, 
at 223 n.48 (quoting Nurith C. Aizenman, Middle Eastern Travelers Face Scrutiny; 
Arab American Activist Attacks Lengthy Interrogations as Profiling, Doubts Useful- 
ness, WASH. POST, Sept. 23, 2001, at  A l l  (quoting a former security head of the 
Federal Aviation Administration)). 
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For example, Stuart Taylor has opposed racial profiling 
black drivers for drugs, "Driving While Black" (DWB). He ar- 
gues, however, that racial profiling of Arabs and Muslims is jus- 
tified in airports, because inter alia "preventing mass murder 
. . . is [an] infinitely more important rationale than the ratio- 
nale behind DWB profiling (finding illegal drugs or guns) [and] 
[a] virulent perversion of Islam is, so far, the only mass move- 
ment in the world so committed to mass-murdering Americans 
that its fanatics are willing to kill themselves in the process 
[and that some of these people] have lived legally in America for 
years . . . ."98 Taylor adds that "DWB is singularly race-based, 
which contravenes both the letter and the spirit of the Constitu- 
tion. Airport profiling takes multiple factors into account, such 
as when the ticket was purchased, how the subject responds to 
questions, e t ~ . " ~ ~  
This argument, however, fails to recognize how crude the 
device of racial profiling is, the ease with which Osama bin 
Laden and A1 Qaeda can circumvent it,100 the corrosive effect it 
can have on Arabs and Muslims and Middle Eastern appearing 
men living here and abroad, and how much it creates the per- 
ception of an American anti-Arab and anti-Muslim animuslO1 
both a t  home and in other parts of the world. 
History may help explain why both this intuitive and rea- 
soned justification of ethnic profiling is wrong. In World War 11, 
98 R. Spencer Macdonald, Notes & Comments: Rational Profiling in America's 
Airports, 17 B W  J. P m .  L. 113, 126 (2002) (citing Stuart Taylor, Jr., The Case for 
Using Racial Profiling at Airports, ATLANTIC, Sept. 25, 2001, available at http:// 
www.theatlantic.com/politics/nj/taylor2001-09-25.htm). 
99 Id. 
100 Cf.  Ruth Wedgwood, The Enemy Within, WALL ST. J., June 14, 2002, at 
A12, available at 2002 WL-WSJ 3397712 (noting that A1 Qaeda can circumvent 
watch-lists (and presumably profiles) by recruiting American citizens). 
101 The Department of Transportation issued a policy statement less than a 
month after September 11 prohibiting racial profiling by airlines: "Do not subject 
persons or their property to inspection, search and/or detention solely because they 
appear to be Arab, Middle Eastern, Asian, andlor Muslim; or solely because they 
speak Arabic, Farsi, or another foreign language; or solely because they speak with 
an accent that may lead you to believe they are Arab, Middle Eastern, Asian, and/ 
or Muslim." Chandrasekhar, supra note 96, at 218 (quoting Policy Statement, U.S. 
Dep't of Transp. Office of Aviation Enforcement and Proceedings, Carrying Out 
Transportation Inspection and Safety Responsibilities in a Nondiscriminatory 
Manner (Oct. 12, 2001) (emailed to airline trade associations and major U.S. air- 
lines on Oct. 17, 2001), available at http://airconsumer.ost.dot.gov/rules/2OOllOl2. 
htm ). 
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we interned 110,000 to 120,000 people of Japanese descent, in- 
cluding 70,000 American citizens.102 We interned relatively few 
German Americans and Italian Americans during that 
conflict. lo3 
Americans generally regard the internments as a blot on 
our history. Nearly every member presently serving on the 
United States Supreme Court has condemned Korematsu v. 
United States,l04 the decision that upheld the Japanese intern- 
ments against constitutional attack. Congress has condemned 
the program and enacted legislation, authorizing reparations to 
surviving victims. lo5 
But perhaps most significant for this analysis, few, if any, 
Japanese-Americans or Japanese immigrants ever engaged in 
espionage, sabotage, or acts against the United States during 
World War 11.106 Unlike the present "war against terrorism," 
the United States had declared war against the enemy, Japan, 
and, at  least the non-citizen Japanese immigrants then residing 
here theoretically owed their allegiance to that country.107 De- 
102 Frank H. Wu, Profiling in the Wake of September ll: The Precedent of Jap- 
anese American Internment, 17 CRIM. JUST. 52, 52-53 (2002). 
103 Evelyn Nieves, Past Recalled for Japanese-Americans, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 
2001, a t  A26 (noting that aside from more than 120,000 ethnic Japanese internees, 
the United States government interned, during World War 11, "nearly 11,000 
Germans and German-Americans and 2,000 Italians"). As heinous a crime as Sep- 
tember 11 was, it pales in comparison with World War 11. In that conflict Ameri- 
cans alone lost 292,131 to battle deaths and 115,187 to deaths from other causes. 
World War 11, 27 FUNK & WAGNALLS ENCYCLOPEDIA 448 (1986). Total Allied civil- 
ian and military losses were 44 million, those of the Axis were 11 million. Id. 
104 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). See also Cole, supra note 
16, a t  993 n.165. 
105 Civil Liberties Act of 1988, 50 U.S.C. Q 1989a (1988) (apologizing for the 
internments and providing restitution to the victims). See also Teresa Watanabe, 
Donor Fund UCLA Chair on WWII Internment, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2003, a t  B1. 
106 See Wu, supra note 102, a t  55; see also Robert Pear, $1.5 Billion Urged For 
Japanese Held in War, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 1983, a t  Al. Although a Congres- 
sional Commission investigating the internments found that the United States 
had intercepted Japanese diplomatic cables indicating that they were employing 
some ethnic Japanese in the United States for espionage, the Commission con- 
cluded that "'no documented acts of espionage, sabotage or fifth-column activity 
were shown to have been committed'" by ethnic Japanese in this country. Id. 
107 See The Nottebohm Case (Liech. v. Guat.), 1955 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 6, 1955), 
available a t  1955 WL 1 (noting that nationality denotes a "bond of allegiancen by 
the national to his or her country). 
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spite that presumption,lo8 nationality and ethnicity actually 
provided little basis for demonstrating that the individuals in- 
volved posed a threat to us. 
B. United States Practice of Racial Profiling Before 
September 11 
Well before September 11, the United States had an unfor- 
tunate history with race relations generally and, more specifi- 
cally, with allowing the police to pick out, stop, question, and 
investigate individuals based wholly or in part on their race.log 
Many police throughout the country often routinely stopped 
black and Latino drivers, suspecting (or hoping) to find evidence 
of drugs or other crimes.l10 In the last five years, however, ra- 
cial profiling has been increasingly attacked. DWB, a descrip- 
tion of the police practice of routinely stopping black male 
drivers, has been roundly condemned.111 Picking individuals 
108 National and international law permit the detention of "enemy aliens" dur- 
ing wartime. See Cole, supra note 16, at 959 (citing the Enemy Alien Act of 1798). 
109 The Supreme Court has upheld the use of pretextual traffic stops in an 
effort to catch what the police suspect to be individuals who have engaged in crimi- 
nal activity. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996). "Racial profiling is 
any use of race, religion, ethnicity, or national origin by law enforcement agents as 
a means of deciding who should be investigated, except where these characteristics 
are part of a specific suspect description." Civil Rights and Education Fund, supra 
note 17, a t  11 (emphasis added). Note that the Civil Rights and Education Fund 
also observed that profiling includes "law enforcement activity that relies in part, 
as well as solely, on race (in the absence of a specific suspect description). . .." Such 
a definition of racial profiling was included in consent decrees between the Depart- 
ment of Justice and the State of New Jersey. Id. at 37 n.17 (citing Consent Decree 
in United States v. State of New Jersey, Civil No. 99-5970, 2 (MLC) (Dec. 30, 
1999), available a t  http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/documents/jerseysa.htm. "Selec- 
tive enforcement based in part on race is no less pernicious or offensive to the 
principle of equal justice than is enforcement based solely on race." Civil Rights 
and Education Fund Report, supra note 17, a t  11. See also supra note 151 and 
accompanying text. 
110 Civil Rights and Education Fund, supra note 17, at 12 (citing studies show- 
ing that blacks were stopped in significantly higher numbers than whites, includ- 
ing a study that between 1988 and 1991, "l'bllacks were 35 percent of those 
stopped" on the New Jersey Turnpike "though only 13.5 percent of the cars on the 
Turnpike had a [bllack .occupant and [bllacks were only 15 percent of all traffic 
violators"). 
111 Before September 11, President George W. Bush not only condemned racial 
profiling, but committed to stopping it in America: Racial profiling "is wrong and 
we will end it in America." Mike Allen, Bush Issues Ban On Racial Profiling; Pol- 
icy Makes Exceptions For Security, WASH. POST, June 18,2003, at A14, available a t  
2003 WL 56498502. Attorney General John AshcroR also condemned racial profil- 
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out because they belong to  a minority group and then subjecting 
them to criminal investigation encourages lazy police prac- 
tices,l12 humiliates the individuals who are so selected,ll3 and 
causes resentment in the minority community against the po- 
lice.114 Lastly, such "racial profiling," which is bound to produce 
a large number of false positives, is an inefficient use of scarce 
police resources .I15 
C. The Fallacy of Racial Profiling 
In a country as racially diverse as the United States with 
millions of people representing each identifiable ethnic or racial 
group, the racial or ethnic background of an individual has vir- 
tually no probative value except to exclude that person from the 
"circle of suspicion."ll6 Thus, for example, let us assume that 
reliable witnesses told the police that they saw a white male 
ing. Eric Ferkehnhoff and Noah Isakson, Ashcroft Calls on Police to End Racial 
Profiling, CHIC. TRIB., Apr. 7, 2001, a t  17. The House introduced a bill not only to 
ban racial profiling, but also to permit profiling victims to sue the police. See H.R. 
2074/S, 107th Cong., (2001). After September 11, neither the House nor the Sen- 
ate moved on the bill. See also infra note 137 (discussing, inter alia, the rein- 
troduction of the "End the Racial Profiling Act"). 
112 See Davies, supra note 20, a t  63 (noting the unreliability of determining 
whom the United States Customs Service decided to strip search using a racial 
profile). See also David A. Harris, Let's Look at What Counts: Racial Profiling 
Doesn't Stop Common Criminals. It Won't Stop Terrorists, Either, LEGAL TIMES, 
Sept. 22, 2003, at 60 ("[Using race takes law enforcement eyes off what. counts 
[suspicious behavior not ethnic background], making them [the police] less 
effective"). 
113 For example, United States District Court Judge Filemon Vela has appar- 
ently been frequently stopped around Brownsville, Texas by Boarder Patrol agents 
and questioned, because of his Latino appearance. See Civil Rights and Education 
Fund, supra note 17, at 16-17 (citing DAVID HARRIS, PROFILES IN INJUSTICE 3-6 
(2002)). 
114 See Davies, supra note 20, at 74. 
115 Professor Harris notes that using racial profiling unnecessarily increases 
the suspect pool: 
All of those in the suspect category [as a result of their racial or ethnic 
profile] then have to be stopped, questioned, searched, and investigated, 
even when their behavior would not have pointed to any reason to do this. 
This spreads our finite investigative resources too thin. It's like looking 
for a needle in a haystack, but adding more hay. 
Harris, supra note 112, a t  60. See also Cole, supra note 16, at 976-77. 
116 See Davies, supra note 20, a t  65-66; United States v. Collins, 532 F.2d 79, 
85 (8th Cir. 1976) (Heaney, J., dissenting) ('While the factor of race eliminates 
from suspicion all persons of another race, it cannot be used to create suspicion of a 
particular person of that race" (emphasis added)). 
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leave a van (which turned out to be filled with explosives) 
outside of the federal building in Oklahoma City. The explo- 
sives are subsequently detonated, causing massive loss of life 
and property. In investigating this crime, the police could prop- 
erly exclude all non-white persons from the "circle of sus- 
pects."ll7 That the alleged perpetrator is apparently white and 
male hardly justifies questioning every white male in 
Oklahoma or in surrounding states. Not only would it require 
enormous police resources to do so, the odds of finding the ac- 
tual perpetrator by this method would be exceedingly remote. 
One might argue that there are fewer members in a minor- 
ity group than there are whites in the United States.118 Mathe- 
matical analysis, however, supports the notion that race or 
ethnicity alone provide scant basis for suspecting an individual 
of terrorist crimes. Most population surveys estimate that 
there are 2.8 million to  6 million Arab and Muslims immigrants 
living in the United States.119 In purely mathematical terms, 
the odds that race or ethnicity alone will yield suspects is in the 
117 For purposes of this hypothetical, assume a lone perpetrator carried out the 
bombing. See Davies, supra note 17, at 54-63 (setting forth a series of hypotheti- 
c a l ~  to explain racial and ethnic profiling and how it violates basic principles of 
fundamental fairness). 
118 Whites, however, are projected to be an increasingly smaller part of the 
overall population of the United States. See Leone1 Sanchez, Migration to Fuel 
Census Growth; Tripling of Hispanic, Asian Populations in U.S. Expected by 2050, 
SAN DIEGO TRIB., Mar. 18, 2004, a t  A3. 
119 See Bill Broadway, Number of U.S. Muslims Depends on Who's Counting, 
WASH. POST, NOV. 24,2001, at A1 (noting that a study commissioned by four Mus- 
lim organizations estimated the number of Muslims living here to be six to seven 
million, that a study commissioned by the American Jewish Committee estimated 
the number to be from 1.5 to 3.5 million, that 2001 Britannica Book of Year esti- 
mated 4.1 million, and that a City University of New York telephone survey esti- 
mated 2.8 million). See also Davies, supra note 20, a t  52 (estimating 3.5 million). 
Another survey using census data from 1990 and 2000 estimated that at that time 
there were nearly 2.9 Muslims in the United States, John R. Logan & Glenn De- 
anne, The Muslim World in Metropolitan America, (Lewis Mumford Center for 
Comparative Urban and Regional Research, University at Albany) Aug. 15, 2003. 
Since by law an individual's religious affiliation may not be inquired of by the cen- 
sus takers, the exact numbers of Muslims living in the United States is not defmi- 
tively known. Some estimate the number to be as high as six millions others in 
between two million and three million. See Joyce Howard Price, 1.2 Million Arabs 
in U.S., Census States, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2003, available at http://washington- 
times.com/national/20031203-113839-953lr.htm (noting that the 2000 census re- 
ported 1.2 million Arabs, but that many Arabs do not practice the Muslim faith 
and that many Muslims are not Arab). 
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order of one in several thousands, odds so remote as to make 
race or nationality relatively little help in identifying 
terrorists.120 
Professor Davies explains these phenomena through the 
following hypotheticals. Assume a reliable witness identifies 
the perpetrator of a robbery as being a "white male." One could 
set forth the following syllogism: 
Major Premise: "The person who committed this robbery 
was a white male." 
Minor Premise: "Defendant is a non-white male." 
Conclusion: "Defendant did not commit this robbery."121 
The result of this syllogism appears almost self-evident, but 
Professor Davies correctly points out that the converse is not 
true: 
Major Premise: "The person who committed this robbery 
was a white male." 
Minor Premise: "Defendant is a white male." 
Conclusion: "Defendant committed the r0bbery."12~ 
Unless there is only one white male, the syllogism is false. She 
notes: 
[Tlhe addition of just one other white male to the cohort would 
reduce the chances of Defendant's responsibility for the crime by a 
full half. The addition of two white males to the group would 
lower the odds to one third, and so on. This should make it clear 
how the possession of a characteristic shared by a group very 
quickly loses its usefulness as  means of including a particular in- 
dividual within a circle of suspicion. The significance of group 
characteristics, such as race or ethnicity, drops precipitously as 
more and more persons are known to share that same characteris- 
tic. In a diverse population, which espouses a commitment to the 
principle of unfettered freedom of movement, its utility quickly 
approaches (even if it never quite reaches) zero.123 
The mathematical result appears counter-intuitive, but it dem- 
onstrates that racial or ethnic profiling is among the shallowest 
bases for suspecting a particular individual of criminal activity 
120 See Davies, supra note 20, at 73-74. 
121 See id. at 66. 
122 Id. 
123 Id.  
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in a society like ours, with millions representing each ethnic 
group. 124 
D. Racial Profiling Encourages Sloppy and Ineficient Police 
Practices 
Relying on racial profiles rather than evidence that a par- 
ticular person or persons have engaged in criminal or other ter- 
rorist activities stifles sound policing and investigating 
practices. By focusing on individuals who fit a racial profile, the 
police are inevitably going to come up with a large number of 
false positives.125 This may have the effect of lulling officers 
and causing them to overlook those who do not fit the profile.126 
For example, Richard Reid, the A1 Qaeda shoe bomber, is a Brit- 
ish citizen, originally from Jamaica, and is not Arab or "Middle- 
Eastern looking."127 Zacarias Moussaoui, the only person 
charged with conspiring to carry out the September 11 attacks, 
is a French citizen. Jose Padilla, the alleged dirty bomber, is a 
Puerto Rican American.128 None of these individuals would 
have been subject to the "Special Registration" program after 
having arrived in the United States. 
124 See Harris, supra note 112, at 60 ("But the third thing the study [commis- 
sioned by the New York Attorney General] revealed was even more important. 
When police used race or ethnicity as one factor - not the only factor, but just one 
factor among many - to decide who to stop, their "hit rate" [the rate at which 
police succeeded in finding dope or guns or in making arrests] was lower than 
when they made no use of race."). But see R. Spencer MacDonald, supra note 98, at 
133 (quoting Gary T. Marx & Nancy Reichman, Routinizing the Discovery of 
Secrets: Computers as Informants, 27 AM. BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST 423 ("[Tlhere is 
nothing illegal or exceptional about being [a middle-eastern] male, purchasing a 
one-way airline ticket, paying for it with cash, and obtaining the ticket last minute 
at the airport. But analysis suggests that when these factors occur together, the 
chances of a skyjacking attempt are increased"); Daniel Pipes, A Call for Zntelli- 
gent Profiling, N.Y. SUN, Dec. 30, 2003, a t  7. 
125 Cole, supra note 16, a t  976-77; see also Harris, supra note 112, at 60. 
126 Apparently some United States governmental officials have recognized this 
problem and are fearful that A1 Qaeda will use some non-Arab or Muslim appear- 
ing individuals to carry out an attack on the United States. Frank Millar, Police 
Quiz al-Qaeda Suspects as US Warns of Attacks, IRISH TIMES, Jan. 19, 2002, at 13, 
available a t  2002 WL 4782744. 
127 See Cole, supra note 16, at 976. 
128 See Human Rights Watch, Arbitrary Detention, in PRESUMPTION OF GUILT: 
HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES OF POST-SEPTEMBER 11 DETAINEES (Aug. 20021, available 
a t  http://~w.hnv.or~reports/2002/us911/USA-08082-05.htm . 
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During World War 11, the Japanese apparently relied pri- 
marily upon Caucasian spies, not those of Japanese ancestry.129 
Al Qaeda is said to have over one billion dollars in assets.l30 
With such resources, Al Qaeda could easily hire white Ameri- 
cans or non-Arab or non-Muslim nationals to carry out opera- 
tions in the United States. Senior law enforcement officials 
stated in a memo of October 2002, which "circulated to Arneri- 
can law enforcement agents worldwide," that "[flundamentally, 
believing that you can achieve safety by looking at characteris- 
tics [racial profiling] is silly. If your goal is preventing attacks 
. . . you want your eyes and ears looking for pre-attack behav- 
iors, not characteristics."131 
Some police officials have argued that members of minority 
groups commit certain crimes in greater numbers than other ra- 
cial groups, justifying the use of race as grounds for "reasonable 
~uspicion."l3~ Researchers and scholars have questioned this 
assumption, particularly in the context of drug offenses.133 
Some scholars argue that racial profiling of minorities has cre- 
ated a self-fulfilling prophecy: because more members of minor- 
ity groups are investigated, more are found criminally 
129 See The Erosion Of Online Privacy Rights in the Recent Tide of Terrorism, 8 
COMP. L. REV. & TECH. J .  131, 139 (2003) (noting that "during the entire course of 
the war, ten people were convicted of spying for Japan, all of whom were Cauca- 
sian" (citing Debra LaFountaine & Pei P. Wang, Historical Background (1995) 
[and] . . . Curtis B. Munson, The Munson Report, available in part at http://www. 
curriculumunits.com/c~cible/whunts/munson report.htm (last visited Oct. 25, 
2003) (noting in this special report to President Roosevelt that all evidence pointed 
to the fact that Japanese Americans were perfectly loyal to the United States)). No 
case of espionage has been documented against any Japanese immigrants or Japa- 
nese-American~ for activities during World War 11. See Pear, supra note 106, a t  
Al. 
130 Zachary Abuza, Funding Terrorism in Southeast Asia: The Financial Net- 
work of A1 Qaeda and Jemaah Zslamiya, 25 CONT. SOUTHEAST ASIA 169 Aug. 1, 
2003, available at 2003 WL 58378389; Indian Sleuths Probe Diamond Network 
Links with A1 Qaeda, PRESS TRUST OF INDIA, June 23, 2002. 
131 Civil Rights and Education Fund, supra note 17, at 29 (quoting Bill 
Dedman, Words of Caution Airport Security: Memo Warns Against Use of Profiling 
as Defense, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 12, 2001). 
132 See Civil Rights and Education Fund, supra note 17, at 17. See also R. 
Richard Banks, Beyond Profiling: Race, Policing, and the Drug War, 56 STAN. L. 
REV. 571, 578 n.29 (2003) (quoting Jeffrey Goldberg, The Color of Suspicion, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 20, 2001, (Magazine)) (quoting a Los Angeles police chief, Bernard 
Parks: "It's not the fault of the police when they stop minority males. . . . It's the 
fault of the minority males for committing the crime"). 
133 See Civil Rights and Education Fund, supra note 17, at 17-19 
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responsible for the target offenses.134 Had white persons been 
investigated as thoroughly, according to these scholars, more 
white persons would be found criminally responsible for the tar- 
get offenses.135 
To the extent that some minorities are believed to commit 
certain crimes more than other groups, query whether the dif- 
ference may be attributable to economic class rather than to  
race or ethnic group identification.136 If one controls for eco- 
nomic class, might even the perceived difference in crime rates 
among racial groups disappear or become significantly less? 
Even assuming arguendo that some racial groups commit more 
of a certain offense than others do, statistics demonstrate that 
the overwhelming number of members of a given race or ethnic 
group are law abiding. Since race or national origin is generally 
an improbable indicator of criminality, racial profiling is unjus- 
tified even if one accepts for argument sake the above-men- 
tioned assumption. 137 
134 Developments in the Law- Race and the Criminal Process, Racial Discrimi- 
nation on the Beat: Extending the Racial Critique to Police Conduct, 10 W v .  L. 
REV. 1494, 1496 (1988) (arguing that targeting African-Americans leads to higher 
arrests and convictions for African-Americans which the police then use to justify 
continuing to target African-Americans). See also Banks, supra note 132, at 578 
n.31 (citing MARC MAUER, RACE TO INCARCERATE 143 (1999); Scott L. Johnson, The 
Self-fulfilling Nature of Police Profiles, in THE SYSTEM IN BLACK AND WHITE 93 
(Michael W. Markowitz & Delores D. Jones-Brown eds., 2000)). 
135 Id. 
136 See Sheri Lynn Johnson, Race and the Decision to Detain a Suspect, 93 
YALE L. J. 214, 238 (1983) (citing McNelly & Pope, Race and Involvement in Com- 
mon Law Personal Crime: A Response to Hindelang, 8 REV. BLACK POL. ECON. 405, 
405-06 (1978)). 
137 State and federal courts have been slow to condemn racial profiling by gov- 
ernmental officials. Although authority exists for the proposition that police may 
not stop an individual based solely on that individual's race, United States v. 
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 885 (19751, the Supreme Court has specifically up- 
held pretextual traffic stops where the officer has used race in whole or in part as 
the real reason for the stop. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996); cf. 
United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465 (1996) (reinstating district court's 
order denying discovery to claimant in a selective prosecution claim and ruling 
that "claimant must demonstrate that the federal prosecutorial policy 'had a dis- 
criminatory effect and that it was motivated by a discriminatory purpose'"). Lower 
courts have followed the Supreme Court's lead in endorsing racial profiling: 
See, e.g., United States v. Harrington, 636 F.2d 1182, 1184 (9th Cir. 1980) 
(finding significance in the fact that a "Mexican" male visited defendant's 
hotel room); United States v. Collins, 532 F.2d 79, 82 (8th Cir. 1976) (re- 
jecting the defendant's claim that his skin color is irrelevant because "the 
color of a person's skin, be it black or white, is an identifying factor which, 
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while insufficient by itself, assists the police in narrowing the scope of 
their identification procedure."); State v. Dean, 543 P.2d 425, 427 (Ariz. 
1975) ("[Tlhe fact that a person is obviously out of place in a particular 
neighborhood is one of several factors that may be considered by an officer 
and the court in determining whether an investigation and detention is 
reasonable and therefore lawful."); see also United States v. Richard, 535 
F.2d 246, 248-49 (3d Cir. 1976) (holding that, even though an informant 
may be using race as the only basis for suspicion, if police couple this with 
other factors, a reasonable articulable suspicion to initiate a Terry stop 
may be justified); State v. Barber, 823 P.2d 1068,1075 (Wash. 1992) (not- 
ing that race may sometimes be a factor in a stop). Even a fairly recent 
case seems to have looked the other way regarding charges of racial profil- 
ing. See United States v. Stone, 73 F. Supp. 2d 441, 447 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) 
("Nevertheless, even assuming that the defendant was singled out for 
closer inspection on the basis of his race in concert with the time and the 
location in which he walked, I am satisfied that the officers' subsequent 
actions fully comply with the Fourth Amendment. . . ."). 
Sean P. Trende, Note: Why Modest Proposals Offer the Best Solution for Combat- 
ing Racial Profiling, 50 DUKE L.J. 331, 356 n.151 (2000). 
A few courts have begun to provide redress to those who have been vic- 
tims of racial profiling. For example, the Ninth Circuit has expressly re- 
pudiated the language in Brignoni-Ponce, suggesting that race may be a 
factor to be considered in stopping individuals suspected of committing 
immigration violations. United States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 112 
(9th Cir. 2000). The court stated that "[tlhe likelihood that in an area in 
which the majority or even a substantial part- of the population is His- 
panic, any given person of Hispanic ancestry is in fact an alien, let alone 
an illegal alien, is not high enough to make Hispanic appearance a rele- 
vant factor in the reasonable suspicion calculus." Id. a t  1132 (citing 
United States v. Salinas, 940 F.2d 392, 394-95 (9th Cir. 1991). Given the 
widely reported racial profiling of African-Americans by the New Jersey 
State police, the New Jersey courts appear to have applied Armstrong far 
more liberally, permitting discovery of police records on stops and profil- 
ing only upon a showing of colorable discrimination. See, e.g., State v. 
Ballard, 752 A.2d 735, 752 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000); see also State 
v. Kennedy, 588 A.2d 834 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991). A few other 
courts have likewise ruled that racial profiling is unlawful: 
See, e.g., City of St. Paul v. Uber, 450 N.W.2d 623, 628 (Mim. Ct. 
App. 1990) (reversing a conviction where part of the officers' suspicion 
stemmed from the defendant's being a white person in a black neigh- 
borhood); Lowery v. Commonwealth, 388 S.E.2d 265, 267 (Va. Ct. 
App. 1990) ("While we agree that the State has a substantial interest 
in apprehending drug traffickers, we do not agree with the Common- 
wealth's argument that this type of racial classification is necessary 
to accomplish that objective. A person's race or national origin does 
not indicate a propensity to traffic in drugs."); State v. Barber, 823 
P.2d 1068, 1075 (Wash. 1992) ("Distinctions between citizens solely 
because of their ancestry are odious to a free people whose institu- 
tions are founded upon the doctrine of equality."); see also United 
States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1131-36 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(holding that language justifying the use of race a t  border stops in 
Heinonline - -  16 Pace. Int'l L. Rev. 49 2004  
PACE INT'L L. REV. 
Regarding Arab and Muslim immigrants, not to  mention 
Sikhs and South Asians, there is little data to  support the con- 
clusion that members of those populations are more likely to 
engage in terrorist activities against the United States than 
members of other groups.138 After all, before September 11, the 
Brignoni-Ponce was "dictum," that circumstances and subsequent Su- 
preme Court decisions had changed to justify abrogation of that "dic- 
tum," and abrogating that "dictum"); . . . cf. Washington v. Lambert, 
98 F.3d 1181 passim (9th Cir. 1996) (condemning repeatedly the in- 
dignities suffered by African-Americans at the hands of law enforce- 
ment officials); Martinez v. Village of Mount Prospect, 92 F. Supp. 2d 
780, 782-85 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (approving a settlement agreement, while 
offering three pages of policy reasons for allowing more racial profil- 
ing cases to proceed). 
Trende, supra, a t  357 n.153. 
It is, however, generally not considered racial profiling for the police, after 
they have received a specific description of a perpetrator, including the perpetra- 
tor's race, to stop individuals of the same race as the perpetrator. See MINN. STAT. 
ANN. 9 626.8471(2) (2003) ("Racial profiling does not include law enforcement's use 
of race or ethnicity to determine whether a person matches a specific description of 
a particular subject"). Even in such a case, however, the police should not be em- 
powered to stop and investigate every member of a minority community sharing 
the same racial characteristic as the perpetrator. See Brown v. Oneonta, 253 F.3d 
769, 781 (2d Cir. 2000) (denying hearing en banc) (Calabresi, J . ,  dissenting) ("Is 
the state creating an express racial classification that can only be approved if it 
survives strict scrutiny when state officers (like the police) ignore essentially eve- 
rything but the racial part of a victim's description, and, acting solely on that ra- 
cial element, stop and question all members of that race they can get hold of, even 
those who grossly fail to fit the victim's description? The answer to that question, 
all but ignored by the panel, seems to me-both on the precedents and on plain 
logic-to be a resounding yes"). 
Aside from the courts, Congress and some state legislatures have taken some 
beginning steps to stop racial profiling. A bill has been re-introduced in Congress 
that would require that police create a record of the race of all persons who are 
stopped along with other relevant criteria to help prevent racial profiling. See 
Sens. Corzine, Feingold Introduce New Racial Profiling Bill, ST. NEWS SERVICE, 
Feb. 26, 2004, available a t  2004 WL 62442723. The bill would also give victims of 
racial profiling a private cause of action. Id. Some states have enacted legislation 
aimed at reducing or eliminating racial profiling. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. 5 2C: 
30-5(d) (2004); MINN. STAT. ANN. 5 626.8471. For a list of states with some form of 
anti-racial profiling legislation and a brief description thereof, see David A. Harris, 
The Reality of Racial Disparity In Criminal Justice: The Significance of Data Col- 
lection, 66 L. & CONTEMP. ROB. 71, 82 n.57 (2003). In some other states, legisla- 
tors are proposing similar measures. See, e.g., Bruce Landis, Proposal Focuses on 
Racial Profiling, PROVID. J.-BULL., Feb. 24, 2004, at B-01 (noting that two Rhode 
Island legislators are proposing a bill to eliminate racial profiling). 
138 "[Tlerrorism is not a Muslim monopoly." Donald A. Dripps, Terror and Tol- 
erance: Criminal Justice for the New Age of Anxiety, l OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 9, 26 
(2003). There are terrorists on both the left and the right, from American Nazis 
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author of the most serious terrorist crime on United States soil 
was a white, Roman Catholic male who was raised in upstate 
New York.139 Perhaps the most telling evidence of the ineffec- 
tiveness of racial profiling is the apparent failure of the govern- 
ment's policies profiling Arabs, Muslims, Sikhs, and South 
Asians to uncover substantial terrorist criminal activity against 
the United States. 
E.  Racial Profiling Offends Arabs, Muslims, Sikhs and 
South Asians and Their Communities, Discouraging 
Them from Being Willing Allies i n  the Fight Against 
Terrorism 
Some have argued that although Arabs and Muslims living 
in the United States have been subjected to  racial profiling, 
such a measure is reasonable given the enormity of September 
11 and the ethnic identity of the perpetrators and of the mem- 
bership of A1 Qaeda.140 Furthermore, the government has de- 
tained some Arabs and Muslims and has scrutinized the 
activities of many Arabs and Muslims; but it has not forcibly 
detained all Arabs and Muslims regardless of their citizenship 
as we did to the Japanese during World War 11. Many Arneri- 
cans are likely to  agree with Kathleen Parker, who stated, 
"[bleing threatened or otherwise harmed because of your ethnic 
origin is persecution. Being subjected to a little extra scrutiny 
because, as it happens, your ethnic origin is the same as that of 
terrorists who just killed more than 6,000 innocent civilians, is 
inc~nvenience."~~~ 
The targets of racial profiling, however, appear to have a 
different perception. "Even the suggestion that people should 
tolerate modest impositions is galling . . . [wlhat looks like a 
and some in the so-called Patriot movement, to environmental terrorists, not to 
mention lone acting individuals like the Unabomber. 
139 For a good discussion of Timothy McVeigh, see Peter G. Chronis, Prejudiced 
Profilers Had Sniper Figured All Wrong, DENV. POST, Oct. 29, 2002, at B-07, avail- 
able a t  2002 WL 6579220. 
140 Cf. Eric L. Muller, Inference or Impact? Racial Profiling and the Intern- 
ment's True Legacy, 1 OHIO. ST. J. CRIM. L. 103 (2003) (arguing that racial profiling 
may be appropriate in some circumstances and that the major failure of interning 
the Japanese during World War I1 was the enormity of the deprivation, not the 
racial profiling itself). 
141 Davies, supra note 20, at 46 (quoting Kathleen Parker, All is Fair in War 
Except Insensitivity, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Sept. 23, 2001, a t  A15). 
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light touch to observers can feel like an awfully heavy hand to 
those who feel it."142 There is some evidence that racial profil- 
ing might inflict both humiliation and "psychic harm."143 For 
example, in June 1993, a black bank executive was pulled over 
by Toledo, Ohio police allegedly for not having a front license 
plate. He had just attended a conference. Instead of issuing a 
ticket, the officer required him to assume a spread eagle posi- 
tion while the officer subjected him to a body search. At that 
precise moment, a bus of conference participants passed by. He 
is reported to have stated, "I never felt so degraded, humiliated 
and belittled in all my life."144 Likewise, Texas state judge Gil- 
berto Hinojosa is often pulled over by immigration authorities 
because of his Latino appearance. He stated that "Southern 
Texas 'feels like occupied territory . . . [ilt does not feel like 
we're in the United States of America."'l45 
Alternatively, consider Ejaz Haider, an editor of an En- 
glish-Language news magazine in Pakistan, who was visiting 
the United States as a Fellow of the Brookings Institution, in 
Washington, D.C. Complying with immigration .regulations 
upon arriving here, Mr. Haider registered with the INS who 
told him to report for an interview within forty days.146 After 
speaking with officials in the State Department and INS, he 
was told he did not have to report. INS agents subsequently 
arrested him and told him he would be spending a night in 
jai1.147 Through the intercession of the Brookings Institution, 
he was released, but others lacking such connections may have 
faced harsher treatment.148 
142 WU, supra note 102, at 57. 
143 See, e.g., Banks, supra note 132, a t  591 n.112 (citing Paul Brest, The Su- 
preme Court, 1975-In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 m ~ .  L. 
REV. 1, 9-10 (1976)). 
144 Civil Rights and Education Fund, supra note 17, a t  20. 
145 Id. at 20 (quoting Jim Yardley, Some Texans Say Border Patrol Singles Out 
Too Many Blameless Hispanics, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2000). 
146 Civil Rights and Education Fund, supra note 17, at 26 (citing George 
Lardner, Jr., Brookings Scholar is Detained by INS; Registration Rule Snags 
Pakistani Editor, WASH. POST., Feb. 5, 2003). See also Ejaz Haider, Wrong Mes- 
sage to the Muslim World, WASH. POST, Feb. 5, 2003, a t  A23. 
147 Id. 
148 Id. 
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Racial profiling is humiliating because it amounts to dis- 
criminatory treatment based on race.l49 In the anti-terrorism 
context, the population as a whole does not share the burden of 
heightened security measures. Rather, those who share the 
burden are a discrete and insular minority, the foreign born 
from a select group of countries and others who look like 
them.150 Racial profiling amounts to  presuming someone is a 
criminal solely because of his or her race or nationality. Even 
when race is "but a factor" among other factors considered, it 
helps serve as a substitute for real evidence that a person may 
be involved in criminal activity.l5l 
What authorities seem to ignore is the effect that such race 
based policies have on the innocent individuals and the commu- 
nities that the policies inevitably touch.152 The overwhelming 
number of Arabs, Muslims, Sikhs, and South Asians that live or 
temporarily reside in the United States are law-abiding. They 
-- - 
149 Justice Breman noted the effects of racial profiling persons of Mexican 
ancestry: 
To be singled out for referral and to be detained and interrogated must be 
upsetting to any motorist. One wonders what actual experience supports 
my Brethren's conclusion that referrals "should not be frightening or of- 
fensive because of their public and relatively routine nature." In point of 
fact, referrals, viewed in context, are not relatively routine; thousands are 
otherwise permitted to pass. But for the arbitrarily selected motorists who 
must suffer the delay and humiliation of detention and interrogation, the 
experience can obviously be upsetting. And that experience is particu- 
larly vexing for the motorist of Mexican ancestry who is selectively re- 
ferred, knowing that the officers' target is the Mexican alien. That deep 
resentment will be stirred by a sense of unfair discrimination is not diffi- 
cult to foresee. 
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 572-73 (1976) (Breman, J., dis- 
senting) (citations omitted). 
150 See Cole, supra note 16, a t  960,981 (quoting John Hart Ely for the proposi- 
tion that 'aliens' were an 'easy case' for a 'discrete and insular minority'). 
151 Note that the bill entitled, "End Racial Profiling Act of 2004" makes any use 
of race illegal in deciding whether to stop a motorist absent a specific description of 
the perpetrator. See also Harris, supra notes 112, at 60 (noting that police were 
less effective in identifying perpetrators even when using racial profiling only "as a 
factor" than when the police looked solely at suspect behavior and did not profile a t  
all). 
152 In the domestic context, racial profiling undermines the credibility of the 
police and, "[als a result, it is a natural reaction of distrustful law abiding citizens 
to think of officers as enemies and fail to cooperate with them in community polic- 
ing programs and general investigations." Jenna K. Perrin, Note, Towards Eradi- 
cating the Pervasive Problem of Racial Profiling in Minnesota: State v. Fort 660 
N.W.2d 415 (Minn. 2003), 27 HAMLINE L. REV. 63, 99 (2004). 
Heinonline - -  16 Pace. Int'l L. Rev. 53 2004 
54 PACE INT'L L. REV. Wol. 16:19 
are or could be our natural allies in the so-called "war against 
terrorism." They are in the best position to know if members of 
their communities are plotting against us.ls3 They could give 
us intelligence, leads, tips, and serve as witnesses to any 
planned "terrorist activity." Good law enforcement requires de- 
veloping close ties to community leaders and the trust of indi- 
vidual members of the community.154 Racially profiling Arabs, 
Muslims, and others weakens ties to community leaders and 
undermines the trust of the community in the fairness and im- 
partiality of law enforcement officials.155 Instead of enhancing 
security, racial profiling thus may be threatening our security, 
by weakening the best source of evidence we would probably be 
able to obtain, evidence from others in the Arab, Muslim, Sikh, 
and South Asian communities. The next section discusses the 
international implications of mistreating Arabs and Muslims in 
the United States and elsewhere. 
Examining the policies of the United States towards Iraq 
and A1 Qaeda, one gets the impression that, to paraphrase Ein- 
stein's comment about the advent of the nuclear bornb,ls6 Sep- 
153 See Dripps, supra note 138, at 27. Professor Dripps notes as follows: "[Alny 
division of suspects along racial, ethnic or religious lines runs the standing risk of 
invidious discrimination. Many entirely innocent persons will be targeted simply 
because of national origin or religion. This not only compromises an important 
principle; it also runs the risk of alienating the very people who are in the best 
position to observe suspicious activity among persons of Middle Eastern extraction 
or Islamic faith." Id. 
154 Maintaining trust and close ties to the community enhances police 
effectiveness: 
Establishing and maintaining mutual trust is the central goal of commu- 
nity partnership. Trust will give the police greater access to valuable in- 
formation that can lead to the prevention of and solution of crimes. I t  will 
also engender support for police activities and provide a basis for a pro- 
ductive working relationship with the community that will find solutions 
to local problems. 
About Community Policing (The Community Policing Consortium), available at 
http://www.communitypolicing.org/about2.html; see also Butterfield, supra note 
81, a t  B7 (quoting the Seattle police's chiefs concern about racial profiling because 
of the importance of the police gaining the trust of the community). 
155 See preceding note for a statement of some principles underlying effective 
policing. 
156 'The unleashed power of the atom has changed everything save our modes 
of thinking, and we thus drift toward unparalleled catastrophes." JOHN BART LET^, 
FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS (15th ed. 1980) (quoting Albert Einstein). 
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tember 11 has changed everything but our thinking. The 
Executive Branch has certainly attempted to change our ideas 
about fundamental legal principles such as access to legal coun- 
sel, confidentiality of communications with counsel, the con- 
demnation of indefinite detention, of torture and degrading 
- - 
treatment, and of so-called preventive wars against countries 
that do not immediately threaten us. But such reflexive ideas 
and policies seem based on the notion that we live in a vacuum, 
that any violations of basic principles of domestic or interna- 
tional law that we commit in the name of security are not only 
justified, but will necessarily advance our security. The grow- 
ing evidence, however, suggests that the Executive's interna- 
tional and domestic policies directed against Arabs and 
Muslims may actually be counter-productive in the "war on 
terror." 
In the fight against A1 Qaeda, we must consider with whom 
we are dealing and the most effective approach for reducing, if 
not eliminating, the threat to our cities and suburbs, facilities, 
aircraft, communications, and, above all, our people.l57 There 
are more than one billion Muslims in the world.158 In the Arab 
world, there are more than 200 million people.l59 Few democra- 
cies exist in the Islamic world;l60 virtually all of the Arab coun- 
157 Portions of this article and particularly this section are taken from Thomas 
M. McDo~el l ,  The Death Penalty: An Obstacle to the "War on Terrorism"? 37 
VAND. J .  TRANS. L. 353, 394-400 (2004). 
158 Islam, FUNK AND WAGNALLS NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA (2003), available at http:// 
www.lexis.com/research/retrieve/frames?~m=6ec098lc4a1412a6af627022a84ab29 
5&docnum=8&~fmtstr=FULL&~startdoc=l&wchp=dGLbUb-lSlW&~md5=eaa60 
4a6dOfIO69d9aef5cae87849b5e. 
159 Arabs, FUNK AND WAGNALLS NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA (2003), available at http:// 
www.lexis.com/research/retrieve/frames?~m=doadadda87b4653fc5a82a58437B28 
c&docnum=l5&~fmtstr=FULL&~startdoc=1 l&wchp=dGLbVlb-lSlW&-md5=7c7 
fd68e8f4dde8235ea80d85e39afec. 
160 The leading one is Turkey, which, unfortunately, possesses one of the 
worst, if not the worst, human rights records in Europe. See Amnesty Int'l., Tur- 
key: Endemic Torture Must End Immediately (Nov. 8,2001), at http://web.amnesty. 
org/ai.ns~ndex/EUR440772001?0penDocument&of=COUNTRIES~UR~Y. 
Turkey's parliament has, however, abolished the death penalty in peacetime, a 
step that Amnesty International had been urging for decades and which the Euro- 
pean Union has required as a condition of Turkey's membership. See Amnesty 
Int'l., Turkey: Abolition of the Death Penalty Welcomed (Aug. 2,  2002), at http:// 
web.amnesty.org/ai.ns~ndex/EUR440362002?0penDocument&of=Abolition 
COUNTRIES/TURKEY. Whether this also signals that Turkey will end its prac- 
tice of torture and other human rights abuses remains to be seen. 
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tries are run by dictators or kings, some more despotic than 
others.161 The Arab countries rank last in the world in ratings 
on freedom of the press and other freedoms.162 Aside from the 
lack of individual rights, the standard of living has declined in 
that part of the world for the last thirty years.163 Nearly 50 
percent of the population in the Arab world is under the age of 
25,164 with one-third under the age of fifteen.l65 In the oil rich 
countries-the Gulf States, for example, economic wealth "has 
benefited a relatively few, and has not been distributed to 
poorer Islamic countries or to  their very large migrant commu- 
nities."l66 The young face little chance of climbing out of devas- 
tating and demoralizing poverty and r e p r e ~ s i 0 n . l ~ ~  
- - - - -  
161 See BERNARD LEWIS, THE CRISIS OF ISLAM 117-18 (2002); see also Fareed 
Zakaria, The Politics of Rage: Why Do They Hate Us?, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 15,2001, a t  
22. 
162 Zakaria, supra note 161, a t  24. 
163 Id. at 25. See also LEWIS, supra note 161, a t  114-17. Concerning economic 
failure, Lewis notes that "Israel's per capita GDP was three and half times that of 
Lebanon and Syria, twelve times that of Jordan, and thirteen and a half times that 
of Egypt." Id. a t  117 (citing Arab Human Development Report 2002; Creating Op- 
portunities for Future Generations, sponsored by the Regional Bureau for Arab 
States/UNDP, Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development). He discussed 
the intellectual life of the Arab world again quoting the Arab Human Development 
Report, "'The Arab world translates about 330 books annually, one-fifth of the 
number that Greece translates. The accumulative total of translated books since 
the Caliph Maa'moun's [sic] time [the ninth century] is about 100,000, almost the 
average Spain translates in one year.'" Id. at 115-16. Even in Saudi Arabia, per 
capita income plummeted from $28,600 in 1981 to $6,800 in 2001. Eric Rouleau, 
Trouble in the Kingdom, FOREIGN AFF., July-Aug. 2002, at 75, 85. 
164 Zakaria, supra note 161, a t  22, 32. 
165 Id. "Today, two in five Saudis are under 15 years old. [Saudi Arabia's] popu- 
lation has exploded while its economy has stagnated with the result that its per 
capita income has dropped." Michael Scott Doran, Palestine, Iraq, and American 
Strategy, FOREIGN AFF., Jan.-Feb. 2003, at 19,28. See also Editorial, The Anger of 
Arab Youth, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2002, at A22. 
166 Max Taylor & John Horgan, The Psychological and Behavioural Bases of 
Islamic Fundamentalism, 13 TERRORISM & POL. VIOLENCE 37, 41 (2001). These 
commentators add that "to many devout Muslims the effects of increased oil 
wealth have been to increase the influence of the West and challenge the social 
basis of Islam, rather than to complement and enhance it." Id. 
167 "Even if many terrorists are not directly driven by poverty, the inequities 
of globalization feed a general anti-Westernism that is a seedbed for Islamism." 
Michael Hirsh, Bush and the World, FOREIGN AFF., Sept.-Oct. 2002, a t  18,28. But 
see ALAN DERSHOWITZ, WHY TERRORISM WORKS 25 (2002) (noting that "the vast 
majority of groups with equivalent or more compelling causes-and with far 
greater poverty and disadvantage-have never resorted to terrorism."); FAREED 
ZAKARIA, THE FUTURE OF FREEDOM ILLIBERAL DEMOCRACY AT HOME AND ABROAD 
138 (2003) (arguing that "[tlhe problem is wealth not poverty" and that the 
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"Throughout the region [the Middle East,] the [Arab] people 
have become ever more disillusioned with the deeply-en- 
trenched dictatorships in the their own countries, with the col- 
lapse of democratic institutions, hollow nationalistic rhetoric, 
and with their failing economies."l68 
Given the failure of economic and political institutions in 
the Arab world, it is not surprising that religion has emerged as 
a major force.169 In the Muslim culture, religion and politics are 
intertwined in a way reminiscent of Western Europe before the 
Reformation.170 The fight against terrorism thus needs to em- 
brace the social and political reality of the Arab world and the 
nature of the organization we are fighting. 
The available evidence suggests that A1 Qaeda is a network 
rather than a single, unified military organization.171 As one 
commentator has written, "[hlaving suffered the destruction of 
unearned income from oil revenues, or, for example in the case of Egypt from the 
Suez Canal and United States, "relieves the government of the need to tax its peo- 
ple-and in return provide something to them, in the form of accountability, trans- 
parency, and even representation"). 
168 See Abbas Amant, Empowered through Violence, The Re-inventing of Is- 
lamic Extremism, in THE AGE OF TERROR 29 (Strobe Talbot & Nayan Chanda eds. 
2001). See also LEWIS, supra note 161, at 117-19. Given the failure of the economic 
and political institutions in Islamic countries, their people are outraged: "The re- 
sulting anger is naturally directed first against their rulers, and then against 
those whom they see as keeping those rulers in power for selfish reasons." Id. at 
119. 
169 Noted religious scholar, Karen Armstrong, has observed that the resound- 
ing defeat of the Arab States by Israel in the 1967 war led to a religious revival in 
the Arab States: "ARer the humiliating defeat of the Arab Armies during the 1967 
Six Day War against Israel, there was a swing toward religion throughout the 
Middle East." KAREN ARMSTRONG, ISLAM: A SHORT HISTORY 171 (2000). 
170 Id. at 169-73. See also LEWIS, supra note 161, at 6-8 (noting that [dluring 
Muhammad's lifetime, the Muslims became at once a political and a religious com- 
munity with the Prophet as head of state" and contending that Islam remains 
deeply involved with politics and state power); Taylor & Horgan, supra note 166, 
at 42 (noting that one of the central positions of Islamic fundamentalism is "the 
general equation of the state with the implementation of Islamn). 
171 See Diaa Rashwan, Impossible to Fight, AL-AHRAM WKLY., Aug. 8-14,2002, 
available a t  http://www.weekly.ahrarn.org.eg/2002/598/opll.htm (last visited June 
20,2003) (observing that Americans had now accepted the European view that "Al 
Qa'eda is actually nothing more than a network and that the violent Islamacist 
groups have no unified command, but communicate and cooperate when it suits 
their different purposes."). Al Qaeda was created in the 1980s from three terrorist 
organizations: '%in Laden's circle of 'Afghan' Arabs, together with two factions 
from Egypt, the Islamic Group and Egyptian Islamic Jihad, the latter led by Dr. 
Ayman al-Zawahiri, A1 Qaeda's top theoretician." See Paul Berman, The Philoso- 
pher of Islamic Terror, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2003, 5 6 (Magazine), at 24. 
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its sanctuary in Afghanistan two years ago, Al Qaeda's decen- 
tralized organization has become more decentralized sti11."172 
Another commentator has analogized Al Qaeda to  "a holding 
company run by a council (shura) including representatives of 
terrorist movements."173 It has also been described as the ter- 
rorist equivalent of the Ford Foundation, providing money and 
other resources for individual terrorists or movements that pro- 
pose terrorist p r 0 j e ~ t s . l ~ ~  
The nature of the organization suggests the means of com- 
bating it. Tactically, the United States and its allies must bring 
to justice those responsible for carrying out the outrages of Sep- 
tember 11 and defeat those who continue to  attempt to terrorize 
the United States.175 Strategically, the United States and its 
Coalition partners must take steps to end support in the Arab 
and greater Muslim world for Al Qaeda and others who would 
resort to t e r r0r i~rn . l~~  The decentralized nature of Al Qaeda 
172 Jessica Stern, The Protean Enemy, FOREIGN AFF., Ju1.-Aug. 2003, a t  27, 
available a t  2003 WL 57276699. Stern adds tha t  Al Qaeda apparently has put into 
practice so-called "'leaderless resistance,"' a tactic popularized by Louis Beam of 
the Aryan Nations, an  American Neo-Nazi group. With the advent of the Internet, 
leaders do not necessarily have to secretly issue orders or to "pay operatives," 
rather, "they inspire small cells or individuals to take action on their own initia- 
tive." Id. See also Eric Bonabeau, Scale Free Networks, SCIENCE, May 2003, ab- 
stract available a t  http://www.sciam.com/article.cfm?colID=l&articleID=OOO3l2 
F5-B86B-lE90-8EA5809EC5880000. 
173 See Pierre Conesa, Background to Washington's War on Teror, A1 Qaida, 
The Sect, LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE, Jan. 2002, available a t  http://mondediplo.com/ 
2002/01/07sect?var~s+zacarias+moussaoui. 
174 Scott Peterson, Islamacists Escalate Fight in  N. Iraq, THE CHRISTIAN SCI. 
MONITOR, NOV. 22, 2002, at 1 (quoting James Lindsay of the Brookings Institu- 
tion). See also JASON BURKE, AL QAEDA, CASTING A SHADOW OF TERROR 208 (2003) 
(noting that the "Al Qaeda hardcore" rejected volunteers who requested a martyr- 
dom operation unless they "came up with their own ideas for attacks"). Al Qaeda 
can also be analogized to joint venture capitalists: ("individuals would approach 
the chief executive and the board (bin Laden, Atef, e t  al.) with ideas they believed 
were worthy of support"); or a publishing house: ("[flreelancers would approach 
them with ideas that would sometimes be funded and resourced but often re- 
jected"). Id. 
175 See Nicholas Lemam, Letter from Washington, What Terrorists Want; Is  
There a Better Way to Defeat A1 Qaeda?, NEW YORKER, Oct. 29, 2001, a t  36. 
176 See Harold H. Koh, On American Exceptionalism, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1479, 
1497-1500 (2003) (criticizing the Bush Administration's largely unilateralist ap- 
proach to combating terrorism and the Administration's violating international 
law in the process); Thomas Carothers, Promoting Democracy and Fighting Terror, 
FOREIGN AFF., Jan.-Feb. 2003, a t  84, 97 (criticizing the Bush Administration's cur- 
rent strategy in handling the war on terror as  not paying enough attention to even 
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underlies the importance of the United States' gaining the coop- 
eration and good will not only of governments, but also of their 
law enforcement personnel and of individual citizens in Arab 
and other Muslim States and communities throughout the 
world.17' In other words, to root out those responsible for the 
handedly promoting democracy around the world); Michael Hirsh, supra note 167, 
at 17 notes: 
But at the same time, the nature of the terrorist threat demonstrated the 
necessity of bolstering the international community, which is built on 
nonproliferation agreements, intelligence cooperation, and legitimizing 
institutions such as the UN, as well as a broad consensus on democracy, 
free markets, and human rights. It also demonstrates the necessity of a 
values-driven foreign policy - and of nation building under multilateral 
auspices in places such as Afghanistan. 
Id. at 18. See also Michael P. O'Connor & Celia M. Rumann, Into the Fire: How to 
Avoid Getting Burned by the Same Mistakes Made Fighting Terrorism in Northern 
Ireland, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 1657, 1750-51 (2003) (noting that the United States is 
resorting to draconian emergency measures similar to those employed by Great 
Britain in Northern Ireland against the IRA, measures which both failed to en- 
hance security or to defeat the IRA. The authors advocate "[dlialogue, cooperation 
and attention to civil liberties were the necessary and effective elements in the 
strategy to eliminate terrorism"). Cf: Philip A. Thomas, Emergency and Anti-Ter- 
rorist Power, 9/11:  USA AND UK, 26 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1193, 1228 (2003) (quot- 
ing Christopher Hewitt's extensive study of British counter-terrorism measures, 
THE EFFECTIVENESS OF ANTI- TERRORIST POLICIES 94 (1984) (''heavy handed repres- 
sion is counter productive")); Robert I. Rotberg, Failed States in a World of Terror, 
FOREIGN AFF., July-Aug. 2002, a t  127, 130 (concluding that "[sltate building 
trumps terror[,]" requires the cooperation of many states, and cannot be done "on 
the cheapn). 
As one commentator has observed concerning how the then impending war in 
Iraq was being viewed by American Muslims and others: 
If 1 percent of that one billion [the world population of Muslims] felt that 
they had sympathy for extremist views, then we are dealing with 10 mil- 
lion people. And if 10 percent of those 10 million were a little more active 
in pursuing those extreme beliefs and views, then we are dealing with a 
potential pool of one million people from which extremist groups and ter- 
rorists can recruit. 
Michele Norris & Melissa Block, All Things Considered, How a potential war with 
Iraq is being viewed by American Muslims and Others (Nat'l Public Radio Broad- 
cast, Mar. 14, 2003) available in Lexis, National Public Radio newsfile (quoting 
Hussein Hakani of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace). 
177 See Tom Ridge, Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, [Ad- 
dress] on Fighting Global Terrorism: Security and Cooperation in the 21st Century 
before Singapore Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Mar. 4, 2004, availa- 
ble at http://www.dhs.gov/dhspubliddisplay?content=33l8. Secretary Ridge stated 
as follows: 
So to fight back [against terrorists], we too must exploit our assets. We 
must investigate and prosecute and confiscate. We must utilize diplo- 
macy, intelligence, law enforcement and asset seizure - a multilateral 
approach to a multinational problem. We must enlist stronger collabora- 
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attacks and who pose a continuing threat, we need a firm but 
measured response simultaneously demonstrating that we are 
not attacking or applying a double standard to Muslims or 
Arabs.178 
A classic terrorist tactic is to provoke an overreaction: 
One [terrorist] recruiting tactic is to stage spectacular acts of ag- 
gression that make the insurgency appear to be powerful and ex- 
citing. What the [terrorist] entrepreneur wants to have happen 
next is a big indiscriminate counterattack, which, in effect, means 
that his enemy has been put to work as his chief recruiter.179 
Unfortunately, the invasion of Iraq, a Muslim country (al- 
beit with a secular and repressive regime) is likely to be per- 
tion and cooperation, and improved information-sharing, both within nu- 
tions and between them. We must use every available tool to repel these 
shadow soldiers. 
Id. (emphasis added). Cf. THE COMMUNITY POLICING CONSORTIUM, supra note 154 
(discussing the need for the police to gain cooperation of the community to police 
effectively on the local level); Buttefield, supra note 81, at B7 (same). But see 
Anthony Cordesman, How Should the United States Respond to Terrorism (Cato 
Institute Policy Forum) Nov. 27, 2000, at 16, at www.artitranscripts.com (last vis- 
ited June 3, 2003) (arguing that "law enforcement partnerships are extremely po- 
litical, extremely limited, often inherently corrupt . . ."). See also BRUCE HOFFMAN, 
INSIDE TERRORISM 94-95 (1998): 
Whereas secular terrorists attempt to appeal to a constituency variously 
composed of actual and potential sympathizers, members of the communi- 
ties they purport 'to defend' or the aggrieved people for whom they claim 
to speak, religious terrorists are at once activists and constituents en- 
gaged in what they regard as a total war. They seek to appeal to no other 
constituencv than themselves. Thus the restraints on violence that are 
imposed on secular terrorists by the desire to appeal to a tacitly support- 
ive or uncommitted constituency are not relevant to the religious 
terrorist. 
Id. a t  94-95. 
17s Cf. LEWIS, supra note 161, a t  103-12 (noting that many in the Islamic world 
have criticized the West and particularly the United States for applying a double 
standard to Muslims and Muslim states). See also Koh, supra note 176, at 1509 
(noting that United States joined with the European Union in demanding that 
Turkey not execute notorious Kurdish Terrorist Abdullah Ocalan); Richard Falk, A 
Roadmap for War, A Flawed Debate, Sept. 27,2002, available a t  http://www.trans- 
national.org/forum/meeV2002/Falk- WarFlawedDebate.htm1 (last visited Mar. 13, 
2003); CALEB CARR, THE LESSONS OF TERROR 181 ("This presents us with another 
enduring truth about the tactics of terror [should a State be tempted to resort to 
them in response to terrorism]; they must never be viewed as an expedient or a 
controllable instrument of policy, one which, after its purpose is served, will simply 
burn itself out"). 
179 Lemann, supra note 175, a t  36 (citing Dr. James Fearon). 
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ceived as "a big indiscriminate counterattack" in the Arab and 
- 
Muslim worlds.180 Likewise, mistreating Arabs and Muslims 
both in the United States and abroad is likely to strengthen the 
extremist elements in Muslim communities here and over- 
seas.lS1 Moderate, more democratic leading elements in those 
societies have difficulty defending against the argument that 
the United States is anti-Arab and anti-Muslim.182 Conse- 
quently, we should adopt, not only with use of our military but 
also with our policies at home, an approach that is most likely 
180 See Iraq War Helped A1 Qaeda, TORONTO STAR, May 20, 2003, a t  A1 (quot- 
ing Paul Wilkinson, head of the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political 
Violence at St. Andrew's University in Scotland) ("The political masters in U.S. 
and Europe underestimated the extent to which bin Laden would use the war in 
Iraq as a propaganda weapon to rejuvenate the movement and attract more 
funds."); Steven R. Weisman, U.S. Must Counteract Image in Muslim World, Panel 
Says, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1,2003, a t  A1 (quoting a Bush Administration panel, "'Hos- 
tility toward America has reached shocking levels"' as a result of the Iraq war and 
increased tension in the Middle East). Many had predicted this outcome. See, e.g., 
Don Van Natta Jr. & Desmond Butler, Anger on Iraq Seen as New Qaeda Recruit- 
ing Tool, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2003, a t  A1 (noting that officials in the United 
States, Europe, and Africa observed that the then imminent invasion of Iraq 
caused a sharp increase in efforts "to identify and groom a new generation of ter- 
rorist operatives" and the officials wony that the invasion of Iraq "is almost cer- 
tain to produce a groundswell of recruitment for groups committed to attacks in 
the United States, Europe and Israeln); Carothers, supra note 176 ( "A U.S. inva- 
sion of Iraq would likely trigger a surge in the already prevalent anti-Americanism 
in the Middle East, strengthening the hand of hard-line Islamist groups and pro- 
voking many Arab government to tighten their grip, rather than experiment more 
boldly with political liberalizationn). But see Fouad Ajami, Iraq and the Arabs'Fu- 
ture, FOREIGN Am., Jan.-Feb. 2003, a t  2 (arguing that the United States need not 
apologize for its unilateralism and that the focus of the invasion "should be mod- 
ernizing the Arab worldn). The prison abuse scandal in Iraq has shocked the Arab 
and Muslim worlds and is yet another example of their perception of United States 
having an anti-Arab and Muslim animus. See Cam Simpson, Arabs cool to Powell 
at Forum; Diplomat's Speech Touches on Scandal, CHIC. TRIB., May 16, 2004, a t  
C3; see also Wayne Washington, Bush Reaches Out to Quell Arab Rage at Inmate 
Abuse, BOSTON GLOBE, May 6, 2004, at Al. 
181 See Chishti & Meissner, supra note 7, a t  1196 ("By targeting Muslim and 
Arab immigrants, the U.S. government has deepened the perception abroad that 
the U.S. is anti-Muslim and that its democratic values and principles are hypocrit- 
ical . . . undermining U.S. relationships with exactly the moderate, pro-Western 
nations and social groups that we need to fight against terrorism"). 
182 Id. at 1200 ("Immigration policy should not rely on enforcement programs 
that give propaganda advantages to terrorist foes and contribute to their ability to 
influence and recruit alienated younger generations"). 
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to  gain the cooperation of our allies and of the moderates within 
the Muslim world and that will most likely isolate Al Qaeda.183 
This article does not discuss economic and political mea- 
sures necessary to enhance human, civil and economic rights in 
the Arab and Islamic worlds.184 To achieve our strategic objec- 
tive requires we give both the fact and appearance of treating 
any accused Muslim fairly. For example, after Britain estab- 
lished internment without trial in Northern Ireland in 1971 to 
combat the Irish Republican Army ("IRA), a policy that was 
largely directgd only at  the Northern Irish Catholic community, 
support for the IRA increased: "The use of internment effec- 
tively alienated a sizeable minority of the population of North- 
ern Ireland and made impossible any cooperation with 
authorities."l85 
That experience is particularly relevant for the fight 
against Al Qaeda. As previously discussed, one would expect 
that members of the Arab and Muslim communities in the 
United States would know most about the activities of other 
Muslims and Arabs here. Instead of attacking these communi- 
183 "[This approach would require] obtaining as much specific local information 
as possible and then, perhaps through the use of native 'subcontractors,' convinc- 
ing people that linking their future to bin Laden would be a bad idea. I t  would 
have to be a slow, careful, patient process that combined punishments of specific 
violent people with the offer of rewards for potential allies of the West. None of 
this would alter the strategy of attempting to disrupt bin Laden's access to money 
and electronic communications and forestall further attacks. But, for the present, 
quiet is America's friend, killing, of Americans by bin Laden, and of Arab civilians 
by Americans, is bin Laden's friend, because it draws ordinary people as well as 
combat troops to his side." Lemann, supra note 175, at 36 (emphasis added). 
When dealing with private terror organizations operating clandestinely in sev- 
eral countries, getting help from the authorities and populus of many countries in 
essential. Note the recent arrest of five people in Spain believed to be involved in 
money laundering for A1 Qaeda. "Spanish investigators had worked in close coop- 
eration with authorities in Germany and in France . . . [and were] also aided by 
authorities in the US., Tunisia, Switzerland and Portugal." Sebastian Rotella, 
THE WORLD 5 Suspects Helped Fund A1 Qaeda, Spain Says, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 9, 
2003, a t  A3. 
184 Peter G. Peterson, Public Diplomacy and the War on Terrorism, FOREIGN 
AFF., Sept.-Oct. 2002, a t  74, 75. 
' 85  O'Connor & Rumann, supra note 176, a t  1657, 1680. See also British Ac- 
tions [in Northern Ireland], Frontline (PBS television broadcast, Oct. 21, 1997) 
available at h t t p : / / w w w . p b s . o r g / w g b h / p a g e s / f r o n t l i n e / t s . h t m l  
(quoting the Northern Ireland Chief of Police who described the internment policy 
as "a disaster"). 
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ties, law enforcement should embrace them.186 In that way, we 
are more likely to be able to identify and apprehend those likely 
to be plotting against us.lS7 This scattershot method of racial 
and ethnic profiling is likely to discourage community members 
from coming forward with the information we need to stop this 
threat.188 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Although understandable given the authors of September 
11 and the awesome magnitude of the attacks, the government's 
policy of racial profiling Arabs and Muslims is likely to contrib- 
ute to anti-American attitudes both here and abroad, to discour- 
age Arabs and Muslims from cooperating with the United 
States police and military officials, and to weaken moderate ele- 
ments of Arab and Muslim societies while strengthening the ex- 
tremist elements both domestically and internationally. 
Additionally, racial profiling is morally wrong. During the 
Iran hostage crisis, I represented two Iranian students. Then 
as now, Iranians (like Iraqis) were required to report to and reg- 
ister with the Immigration and Naturalization Service. After 
walking into the federal building in Los Angeles with my two 
clients, I saw in the drab corridors of INS a sea of Iranian faces. 
It was chilling. We are more true to ourselves and can better 
protect our society by adopting more measured investigative ap- 
proaches and by doing the hard but time tested methods of in- 
vestigation, with the aid of the Muslim and Arab communities 
and in cooperation with our allies throughout the world. 
186 For example, law enforcement officials could establish a program like that 
of Dearborn, Michigan, which guaranteed that  "no immigration consequences 
would flow from [immigrants] coming forward to be interviewed." Chishti & 
Meissner, supra note 7, a t  1198. 
187 Peter M. German, Money Laundering and Corporate Governance from a 
Canadian Perspective, 16 FLA. J .  INT'L L. 107, 109 (2003) ("Simply put, a collabora- 
tive approach is the only way to detect, deter, and destabilize global criminal enti- 
ties"). For a discussion of collaboration and cooperation on the community level, 
see supra note 154. For a discussion of such collaboration on the international 
level, see supra note 177. 
18s As one commentator has noted the importance of grass roots efforts against 
terrorist organizations, "The more useful anti-insurgency [and anti-terrorist I tac- 
tic is to compete, literally door to door, for people's loyalty with the coinage of loy- 
alty being willingness to inform on one side or the other)." Lemann, supra note 
175, at 36. 
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